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Fiji 
The repercussions of the political
crisis caused by George Speight’s
attempted coup of May 2000 still had
overwhelming impacts on sociopoliti-
cal and economic arrangements in Fiji
throughout 2005. In fact the tasks of
both the interim government since the
crisis of 19 May 2000 and the elected
government after the general election
in 2001 have been difficult and chal-
lenging. Not only did these govern-
ments have to deal with restoring the
economy, but more important, they
also had to initiate solutions to mini-
mize, or better still, totally eradicate
Fiji’s coup culture. Diverse socio-
political and economic interests had
to be negotiated and harnessed for
the sake of political stability and
economic growth. These were top
priorities, given the fact that all states
are now part of a global political
economy in which there is little
control over changing economic
circumstances. Political instability as
experienced in Fiji after 1987, when
the first two coups occurred, has
inevitably complicated the chances
of economic development.
The year 2005 was greeted in Fiji
with ongoing political dilemmas,
which were expressed through a con-
tinuous war of words between the
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua/
Matanitu Vanua (sdl /mv) coalition
government of Prime Minister Laise-
nia Qarase and the Republic of Fiji
Military Forces and its commander,
Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama.
Both the sdl and the mv parties
were formed after the 2000 political
crisis. The sdl was formed by Qarase
during his term as interim prime min-
ister, and the mv was first formed in
Vanua Levu (Fiji’s second biggest
island) by chiefs and people who sup-
ported the Fijian cause advocated by
coup leader Speight. Qarase’s solution
to political instability centered on a
reconciliation process, whereby an
independent unity commission would
be established through legislation to
offer solutions for the causes of the
2000 crisis. On the other hand, Com-
modore Bainimarama strongly advo-
cated applying the rule of law to all
offenders. By January 2005, Baini-
marama had issued warnings against
the perpetrators of the 2000 coup,
whom he believed were still not being
dealt with by the law. He warned,
“For the financiers and the supporters
of the rebels . . . I am anything but
an officer and a gentleman” (The
Review, Jan 2005, 1–5).
Fiji’s continuing political tensions,
strongly expressed in 2005, are multi-
layered. Beneath the much-explained
interethnic conflict, which emerged as
part of Fiji’s colonial legacy, are other
struggles that have evolved from time
immemorial and intensified through
modern competitions for power. The
ongoing conflict between government
and the military highlighted both
modern and traditional conflicts
expressed through state institutions.
Bainimarama’s consistent stand on
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national security issues and the need
to bring the 2000 coup perpetrators
to justice became the center of contro-
versy between the military and the
sdl /mv government, which has its
power base in a number of coup-
prone vanua (land-based traditional
political entities). Qarase’s belief in
reconciliation as a long-term solution
to Fiji’s political instability resulted in
a Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity
Bill, which is currently before Parlia-
ment. The bill promotes reconciliation
through the principles of restorative
justice, where the “wrong” and the
“wronged” are brought together to
discuss and resolve their problems.
Based partially on the Fijian custom-
ary way of veisorosorovi (traditional
apology), it is envisaged that in the
long-term, this process of reconcilia-
tion will heal wounds and perma-
nently solve problems (Durutalo
2003; FIB, July 2005, 12–14). How-
ever, using the traditional methods of
veisorosorovi to appease the wrongs
already committed has not been
nationally acceptable to the different
ethnic groups in Fiji. Even before
consideration of the bill in Parlia-
ment, opposition intensified when a
few of the “chiefly perpetrators” of
the 2000 coup were released from
prison to serve their sentences extra-
murally. These included former vice
president of the Republic of Fiji, Bau
high chief Ratu Jope Seniloli; the Tui
Cakau and high chief in the Matanitu
of Tovata, Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu;
and Viliame Savu, a pioneer Fijian
nationalist (Fiji Times, 5 Jan 2005, 1;
5 Feb 2005, 6).
Different groups expressed con-
cerns about the bill on a number of
grounds. First was the appearance
that, if passed, the bill would endorse
two sets of laws in Fiji: the introduced
rule of law and a semblance of cus-
tomary law. The latter, based on
restorative justice, would cater mostly
for some groups of indigenous Fijians.
Prime Minister Qarase explained:
“The bill is an approach to justice
adopted in other nations that have
been driven and damaged by internal
strife. It is undeniable that large num-
bers of active sympathizers of that
upheaval felt they were standing for
indigenous rights. But their actions
were against the law. What they did
was related to the grievances, insecu-
rities and fears of the Fijian people,
born out of a colonial decision to
bring to Fiji settlers from India. Two
distinct ethnic groups, with quite
different cultures and religious beliefs
were thus living in our islands. Colo-
nial policy largely kept them apart.
. . . This polarization brought us to
the coups of 1987 and 2000 and to
the legal initiative we have launched
to spur and complement efforts for
accomplishing justice and reconcilia-
tion” (FIB, July 2005, 11).
The application of the rule of law
has become problematic to different
groups of Fijian leaders. While the
military commander believes in equal-
ity before the law and its application
as a deterrent to crime, the prime
minister believes that wholesale appli-
cation of the rule of law would ignore
the nature of crime committed by the
coup perpetrators. The logical conclu-
sion of this argument would be that
the British colonizers were responsible
for the coups in 1987 and 2000. Since
Fijian involvement was only second-
ary, then the rule of law should be
modified accordingly. Through recon-
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ciliation, the wrong and the wronged
can forgive each other; the wrong
will never re-offend, and long-lasting
peace can be an end result. The twist
in this argument is the belief, as
argued by the prime minister, that:
“The country won’t enjoy stability
and hence peace, progress and pros-
perity unless Fijians remain on top
politically. That is the way it is in Fiji.
It will remain so until indigenous
Fijians feel confident about their place
in a land where they are now nearly
54 percent of the population, having
recovered from a minority position”
(FIB, June 2005, 8).
The attempt to introduce a Recon-
ciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill
contributed to the challenge of bring-
ing about economic growth in Fiji.
Expiring and non-renewed land leases
contributed to increasing urban
squatter problems, while global
economic reforms caused declining
export earnings from sugar and gar-
ments. Unemployment rates were
slowed somewhat as mostly Fijian
males were recruited for reconstruc-
tion work in Iraq and Kuwait. By
April 2005, approximately 20,000
Fijians had applied for reconstruction
work through two recruiting compa-
nies, Meridian Services Agency and
Global Risk (FIB, April 2005, 3–7).
As part of an effort to look beyond
Australia and New Zealand for new
trade partners and markets, a trade
mission visited India in 2005. India
offered Fiji a soft loan of f$86 mil-
lion and a team of technical experts
to overhaul the ailing sugar industry.
The model would be the industry in
the Indian city of Mysore, a highly
integrated producer of sugar, electric-
ity, ethanol, and organic fertilizers. In
addition, four memoranda of under-
standing were negotiated, along with
two bilateral agreements concerning
water resources management and
coconut industry development. The
four memoranda, focused on health
and medicine, tourism, information,
and communication technology,
enabled the establishment of a joint
trade commission, which will meet
annually (FIB, Nov 2005, 8). India
has a lot to offer Fiji in the area of
health, and a number of patients are
sent to India for medical treatment.
Tourism development may benefit
both countries.
Recently Fiji and Nauru have
joined Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Tonga in
abandoning the “One China” policy
and courting Taiwan. In mid-2005
Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian
was accorded a full traditional Fijian
ceremony of welcome and received
by Fiji government delegates at Fiji’s
Nadi International Airport. China’s
ambassador to Fiji, Cai Jinbiao,
expressed his government’s disap-
pointment with Fiji for officially
recognizing the arrival of Chen Shui-
bian. Relations with China deterio-
rated further in mid-May, when Fiji
and Papua New Guinea supported
Taiwan’s bid to join the World Health
Organization (FIB, June 2005, 23–24). 
New laws and regulations regard-
ing global and regional trade have
incited conflicts between Pacific coun-
tries including Fiji, Vanuatu, and
Papua New Guinea. Fiji responded
to Vanuatu’s ban on Fiji’s biscuits by
imposing its own ban on Vanuatu
kava. Vanuatu is not a member of the
World Trade Organization, and so
avoided the rules disallowing such
trade bans. However, the two coun-
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tries discussed lifting their bans dur-
ing the sixteenth meeting of the Mela-
nesian Spearhead Group in Goroko,
Papua New Guinea, in 2005. Also
discussed at the meeting was Fiji’s
earlier ban on imports of Ox & Palm
corned beef after a negative report
about the processing plant in Papua
New Guinea (FIB, Sept 2005, 32–33).
Fiji has maximized its benefits from
tourism through innovative changes
by the government’s visitors bureau.
Tourism is now the biggest earner of
foreign exchange, with visitor arrivals
reaching a record 495,008 in 2005,
up from 430,800 in 2003. The Fiji
Visitors Bureau forecasts that in the
year 2007 there will be 610,000 visi-
tors, and a total foreign exchange
earning of a billion dollars (FIB, Sept
2005, 10).
The boom in the tourist industry
also caused some indigenous Fijian
owners to think seriously about how
to protect and profit from their nat-
ural resources. In 2005, a bill for the
state to return qoliqoli (traditional
fishing grounds) to their indigenous
owners was finally introduced in Par-
liament. A request by chiefs for the
return of qoliqoli had been granted
by the British Crown as early as 1881,
but nothing had ever been done about
it (FIB, June 2005, 20–21). Traditional
qoliqoli owners located near hotels
(which are almost wholly foreign
owned) have been unable to get access
to traditional fishing grounds because
the state still “owns” the resources
and has given access through leases to
hotel owners. Some resource owners
are also concerned about the damage
done to the natural environment
through the construction of large
hotels. In 2005, Fijian landowners
from Mobi and Nabila villages in the
district of Nadi on the western side
of Viti Levu threatened to disrupt
the construction of the Marriott Fiji
Resort because of damage to their tra-
ditional qoliqoli. The Fijian Resource
Owners Group, led by retired politi-
cian and western Fijian chief Ratu
Osea Gavidi, has been vocal in high-
lighting these concerns. On the other
hand, the hotel owners are urging
consideration of the benefits that the
government gains from tourist dollars
(FIB, June 2005, 21).
Whichever party wins in the 2006
general election, Fiji’s leaders will
continue to face the challenges of
enhancing the country’s economic
growth while promoting political
stability. 
alumita l durutalo
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New Caledonia
The “post-colonial” process of nation
building continued in Kanaky/ New
Caledonia in 2005, as the new gov-
ernment elected in May 2004 entered
its second year. The political stars of
Avenir Ensemble (ae, or Future
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Together) and Palika-uni (Parti de
Liberation Kanak plus the rump Front
de Libération Nationale Kanak et
Socialiste, or flnks) rose, relative to
the stars of Jacques Lafleur and his
Rassemblement pour la Calédonie
dans la République (rpcr) and the
pro-independence Union Calédoni-
enne (uc), though the minority ae
government (only 16 out of 54 seats
in Congress) had to share power in
the cabinet and thus continue nurtur-
ing a case-by-case consensus in order
to pass local “laws of the country.”
Moreover, contentious issues remained
unresolved, such as creating a local
citizenship, protecting local hiring,
restricting the electorate on important
votes, and balancing economic devel-
opment with much-needed social
programs. The struggles over increas-
ing nickel exports in the North and
South provinces, in the face of mili-
tant labor strikes and Kanak custom-
ary and/or environmental protests,
often disrupted the country.
In January, supporters of indepen-
dence organized a three-day com-
memoration of the twentieth anniver-
sary of the assassination by French
sharpshooters of Eloi Machoro and
Marcel Nonaro in La Foa. Both are
regarded as martyrs in the flnks
uprising of 1984–85, though the
French State and loyalist settlers
called them terrorists. At the opening
of a new sociocultural hall in Canala
named after Machoro, Jean Pierre
Pouperon of the organizing committee
said the event expressed both a duty
to remember and a message of unity.
The organizers hoped to show that
Machoro and Nonaro were fighting
for justice and freedom, both for the
indigenous Kanak and for other
ethnic groups exploited by French
colonialism. Because of post-1980s
divisions in the flnks, the organizers
wanted to remind people of the need
for solidarity in order to achieve the
“common destiny” proposed by the
1998 Noumea Accord. Palika spokes-
man Sylvain Pabouty argued that
Machoro, who smashed a ballot box
in a famous incident in November
1984 and then conducted an active
rural struggle to recover stolen lands,
had helped to unify the Kanak move-
ment on the ground, shake up the
colonial system, and internationalize
the independence struggle by attract-
ing more support abroad, culminating
in the United Nations’ inscription of
the territory on its decolonization list
in 1986. Jean-Paul Caillard, another
activist, said that the flnks revolt
had forced France to create three
provinces, so that Kanak leaders
could govern the North and Islands
provinces—a success that “saved the
existence of a people”—and that
individual democratic rights, which
had once been used as a colonial
weapon against collective indigenous
liberation, now served decolonization
instead (kol, 13 Jan, 17 Jan 2005).
The local branch of the League of
the Rights of Man, led by Kanak
activist Elie Poigoune, held several
colloquia during the year to encour-
age public discussion on important
issues. In mid-June, Billy Wapotro of
the Protestant Educational Alliance
and author-teacher Dr Louis-José
Barbançon spoke about the meaning
of a “common destiny” and how to
achieve it. Wapotro urged people to
study history in order to change it; to
avoid the tragic confrontations of the
past, Kanak and non-Kanak must find
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ways to coexist through active dia-
logue leading to greater mutual under-
standing. Barbançon said French set-
tlers needed to become “Oceanians of
European origin”; many were already
intermarried with non-Europeans and
should work toward better ways to
share the country’s riches. In the dis-
cussion that followed, Poigoune said,
“The common destiny is built slowly
every day if we believe in it,” notably
in schools, municipalities, churches,
and mixed couples, though it still
required more promotion in civic and
political circles (kol, 9 July 2005). At
a second colloquium in July, Octave
Togna, director of the Jean-Marie
Tjibaou Cultural Center, reminded
the audience of the 1983 Nainville-
les-Roches roundtable in France,
where Kanak and loyalists had agreed
to recognize each other’s heritages
and rights; he advocated political
cohesion through the teaching of
cultural diversity to young people:
“a common destiny is a permanent
quest.” Author Pascale Bernut-
Deplanque warned that local political
citizenship would be insufficient with-
out intercultural education based on
mutual recognition: “The challenge is
to establish a balance among identi-
ties by favoring an integration that
is not an assimilation [to France].”
High Chief Nidoish Naisseline of
Maré argued that “custom” is above
all an exchange, and since unesco
recognized the equality of all cultures,
“there is no contradiction between
being rooted and going out into the
world, or between tradition and
modernity” (kol, 9 Aug 2005). After
Mareen women organized a protest
to demand their inclusion in the new
Customary Senate, because of their
role in building interclan bonds
through marriage, Naisseline sup-
ported them at a third colloquium,
arguing that the Senate was not a
traditional institution anyway but
rather was intended to defend all who
lived according to Kanak custom, not
just male chiefs (kol, 24 Aug 2005). 
On 24 September, the date of
French annexation in 1853, the Mwâ
Kâ (a twelve-meter-high totem pole
first sculpted for the 150th anniver-
sary in 2003) was honored again in
its now-permanent setting across from
the Territorial Museum in Noumea.
Modeled after designs on the center
post of a traditional chiefly house,
each of its eight symbols was carved
by a sculptor from one of the Kanak
cultural-linguistic regions. rpcr
Mayor Jean Lèques had first banned
the Mwâ Kâ from the main square of
Noumea, whereupon rpcr leader
Jacques Lafleur had had it placed on
the grounds of the Southern Province
headquarters until he changed his
mind last year. The Mwâ Kâ was then
placed in a huge concrete canoe in its
current location, making it into a
mast, and this year a tall, elderly
paddler was added, along with a
garden of native plants. As Kanak
sculptor Narcisse Decoire explained,
“The Mwâ Kâ is a sign of our cus-
tom, it’s the link between the people
of the mountains and the people of
the sea . . . the old man, the paddler,
in the canoe will show that after 150
years, the Kanak people are still here”
(ran, 18 July 2005). At the 24 Sep-
tember ceremony attended by several
thousand people, organizer George
Mandaoué of the Customary Senate
added, “The Kanak don’t want to
take possession of the city but rather
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erect the center post of a chiefly house
in which all the communities of the
territory have their place.” The Mwâ
Kâ has become, therefore, a symbol
to many of the common destiny idea,
despite Lèques’s sarcastic comment
that differences are not erased by
magic (he would receive the French
Legion of Honor a few weeks later
for his twenty years as mayor). ae
cabinet minister Didier Leroux asked,
“Are we ready? Have we vanquished
our fears, overcome our wounds?” He
shared with Déwé Gorodey, Kanak
vice president of the government, the
sentiment that the Mwâ Kâ repre-
sented all citizens of the country
during a time of transition and recon-
ciliation. Some other settlers and met-
ropolitan French complained about
using only Kanak symbols to repre-
sent their common destiny, while
some Kanak said a “national” Mwâ
Kâ was untraditional (NC, 23 Sept,
26 Sept 2005).
Such mixed feelings, despite so
many good intentions, typify the
ongoing struggle to build a nation in
a multiethnic country whose majority
still opposes independence. The year
began with a political debate over
whether the ae should be allowed to
participate in the usual follow-up
meeting to ensure the implementation
of the Noumea Accord, since the ae
had not existed when the accord was
signed by the rpcr and flnks and
many of its members had in fact voted
against it. Opposition came mainly
from Lafleur and the rpcr, because
the ae is composed largely of dissi-
dents from that former ruling party.
A compromise allowed the ae, which
now rules the populous South and
leads the territorial Congress and
governing cabinet, to participate, in
honor of what Southern Province
President Philippe Gomès called “elec-
toral reality” (pir, 12 Jan 2005). Two
key issues for the pro-independence
parties were the “frozen” electorate
(only those resident in the country in
1998, the year of the Noumea Accord,
and their descendents should be able
to vote on issues affecting sover-
eignty), which is also tied to the
notion of creating a local citizenship
and protecting local employment in
hiring; and renewing French-funded
development contracts to promote
“re-balancing” between the wealthy
South and the two Kanak-ruled prov-
inces, especially to enable the North
to build a nickel-processing plant. The
flnks envisions future independence,
though Palika-uni and the uc differ
in their degrees of satisfaction over
progress under the Noumea Accord,
mainly because Palika controls the
Northern Province. Meanwhile, the
rpcr supports a “sliding” electorate
that would allow any resident of ten
years or more to vote in provincial
elections, while the ae did not have
a strong position on that issue but
agreed with the others that French
money should keep flowing into local
development projects (NC, 17 Jan
2005).
French Overseas Minister Brigitte
Girardin urged the parties to over-
come their divisions to ensure contin-
uing progress, but she also pointed
out that the rpcr (which is affiliated
with her boss President Jacques
Chirac’s own party) retains all three
of the country’s seats in the French
Parliament and therefore has to be
respected as “the primary political
force in New Caledonia” (NC, 21 Jan
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2005). The restriction of the electorate
implied in the Noumea Accord was
approved by the European Court of
Human Rights in mid-January, which
was a bitter disappointment for both
the local branch of the National Front
(which holds four seats in Congress)
and a Movement for France com-
posed of metropolitan immigrants
who resent being treated like “second-
class citizens” (NC, 13 Jan 2005). The
pro-independence parties were elated
by the European Court’s decision, but
Rock Wamytan, who had signed the
Noumea Accord for the flnks in
1998, was disappointed when Girar-
din said that a new law proposal
would have to be ironed out for the
French Parliament to vote on late in
2005 or early 2006. She also said that
President Chirac had promised to
clear up the dispute before the end of
his final term in office, which Wamy-
tan interpreted as an additional delay,
since the next presidential elections
will be in 2009. He also complained
that local hiring for jobs was not yet
protected in the face of massive immi-
gration aided by French State sub-
sidies for metropolitan airline tickets
(pir commentary, 27 Oct 2005).
Girardin agreed, however, to extend
the 2000–2004 aid contracts through
2005 and to proceed with developing
new ones for 2006–2010, to continue
to study the feasibility of introducing
the euro currency to the French
Pacific, to help the nickel-processing
plant projects in the North and South,
and to continue to transfer self-
governing powers to New Caledonia
(kol, 20 Jan 2005). In May, only one
third of local voters cast their ballots
on the new European constitution,
which Chirac and the rpcr cam-
paigned hard for: 78 percent voted
yes, but to no avail, as 55 percent of
French voters rejected it (NC, 31 May
2005; pir , 6 June 2005). Pro-inde-
pendence parties abstained (kol, 8
May 2005).
The biggest political story of the
year was the decline of Lafleur within
the very party he had founded almost
thirty years ago, in 1977. In January,
he decided to pass on the party’s lead-
ership to Pierre Frogier, the other
rpcr deputy to the French Parlia-
ment. Like Charles de Gaulle, Lafleur
has repeatedly threatened to retire
whenever getting his own way was in
doubt, and agreed to stay on after his
supporters begged him to remain.
After the May 2004 elections, when
the rpcr lost key seats to the ae, he
had resigned from his presidency of
the South and also his seat in Con-
gress, while retaining his post of
deputy to Paris (TP, 18 Jan 2005). At
first he had also urged Frogier to
resign from the new territorial cabinet
and was angry when he refused, but
later recanted, saying that he hoped
Frogier would plan another thirty
years ahead for the rpcr. Frogier
remained active in the opposition in
the South and Congress, saying, “It is
definitely impossible to work in con-
sensus and confidence with the new
[ae] team in power” (NC, 19 Jan
2005). By May, he said in an inter-
view with Les Nouvelles-Calédoni-
ennes that the rpcr would continue
to fight for a special Caledonian iden-
tity “rooted in the Pacific but without
distancing itself from France [and]
which does not exclude those who
have chosen to live here, because there
is room for everyone.” The rpcr
would choose a new president, by
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secret ballot, and its members, not
Lafleur, would decide who would
replace its founder as candidate for
deputy in 2007 (NC, 2 May 2005).
Lafleur suddenly talked of “treasons
and plots” in the party (NC, 5 May
2005) and presented himself as a can-
didate again for its presidency in June,
since he had really expected to share
leadership with Frogier, of whom he
boasted, “I know him perfectly well,
I made him” (NC, 4 June 2005). He
said he would close down the weekly
party paper Les Nouvelles-Hebdoma-
daire because it was too supportive
of Frogier (pir, 7 June 2005). At the
rpcr congress in July, Frogier won
the presidency with more than three-
quarters of the ballots, and Lafleur
left for Australia (ran, 6 July 2005).
He finally resigned from the rpcr in
December, calling Frogier’s team
“totally inept” (NC, 29 Dec 2005),
and he lost a lawsuit for threatening
a local publisher by phone in May
2004 (NC, 17 Sept 2005).
Meanwhile, the ae, which is
affiliated with the metropolitan Union
Démocratique Français (udf), a major
rival of Chirac’s party, welcomed a
visit in February by the udf President
François Bayrou, who called for more
“transparency” in French overseas
policy (NC, 10 Feb 2005). In May,
the ae held two days of discussions
among its supporters and the public
over contentious issues such as the
Goro/ Prony nickel project in the
South; developing more programs for
young people to fight unemployment
and delinquency; diversifying air
service for tourism, teaching Kanak
languages in schools (since studies
showed it helped young Kanak
succeed in other subjects as well);
improving the financial viability of
social programs; building more
affordable housing; and protecting
the environment (NC, 2 May 2005).
In July, Harold Martin, a former
rpcr politician who had defied
Lafleur’s authoritarian leadership and
joined the ae, was reelected Speaker
of the Congress with 22 out of 54
ballots after three rounds of voting.
He touted the success of the ae in
garnering case-by-case support on
issues and in enhancing New Caledo-
nia’s role in the region; his top priori-
ties were expanding local employment
opportunities and affordable housing
and lowering middle-class taxes (pir,
28 July 2005). At its November con-
gress, the ae agreed to pursue the last
idea further, to promote local citizen-
ship as complementary to French citi-
zenship (not an eventual replacement
for it, as the pro-independence parties
wanted), and to reduce dependency on
French State aid. Martin was reelected
president of the ae, receiving 93 per-
cent of the votes as the sole candidate
(NC, 7 Nov 2005).
François Baroin replaced Girardin
as French Overseas minister in June,
after serving Chirac faithfully in sev-
eral capacities (NC, 4 June 2005), and
in September, Michel Mathieu moved
over from French Polynesia to be
French high commissioner in New
Caledonia, replacing Daniel Constan-
tin (NC, 9 Sept 2005). More impor-
tantly, French money kept rolling in.
One subsidy that drew objections
from the pro-independence parties
was “aid to territorial continuity,”
meaning cheaper airline tickets for
metropolitan French who wanted to
fly home for vacation. Such aid, how-
ever, was reserved for Caledonians of
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lower income levels and of at least
ten years residence and their children.
Constantin, among others, argued
that such aid should be available to
all French people in New Caledonia,
to counter “anti-metropolitan
racism,” and Leroux agreed that it
should help all residents “to discover
France” (NC, 7 May 2005; kol, 12
Aug 2005). France will also continue
its development aid for 2006–2010,
especially for affordable housing and
local infrastructure, having paid New
Caledonia over us$2 billion the
previous year. In 2004, French aid
accounted for one-fourth of New
Caledonia’s gross domestic product
(pir, 24 Aug 2005; NC, 17 Aug, 31
Aug, 6 Sept 2005). As for local taxes,
the property tax was lower than in
France but remained important for the
territorial government (Kanak tribal
reserves are exempt because they are
communally owned), and the income
tax passed in 1982 (under the Tjibaou
government) was adjusted to lighten
the load for the middle classes, the
main base of support for the ae (NC,
31 Aug, 29 Dec 2005). At the end of
2005, the Congress approved a us$1
billion budget for 2006, thanks to
votes from the ae, uc, and some
National Front members (pir, 28
Dec 2005). In the South Pacific, New
Caledonia’s per capita income is sec-
ond only to Australia’s. On the other
hand, its inflation was the highest in
a decade in 2005, at 2.6 percent (NC,
12 Jan 2006).
In June, the results of a controver-
sial population census, which Chirac
said could not include ethnicity, came
out: about 230,000 inhabitants,
despite a uc boycott that reduced the
total by perhaps 10 percent. The
wealthy, multiethnic South had
165,000 people, or 71 percent of the
total population; the North 44,000,
or 19 percent; and the Islands Prov-
ince 22,000, or 10 percent. Noumea,
the capital, has grown by 20 percent
in less than a decade to 91,000 (pir,
16 June 2005; NC, 15 June 2005).
With only about one-third of the
population living in Kanak-governed
areas, and those Kanak living in
Noumea continuing to maintain
residence and vote in the North and
Islands provinces, the South’s loyalist
domination, and thus the territory’s,
is likely to continue. The flnks has
no seats in the Southern Provincial
Assembly, yet in the Southern primary
schools, a new pamphlet on citizen-
ship promoting “living together” is
being used (NC, 26 Oct 2005). The
South is also investing heavily in
affordable housing to defuse the
growing squatter-camp time bomb,
as shown by a riot in March between
200 young partygoers and police in
the so-called “Coca-Cola squat” in
Montravel (NC, 7 March, 8 March,
9 March 2005; pir, 8 March 2005).
Memories of the Kanak–Wallisian
confrontations in St Louis, which
forced the government to relocate the
Polynesians, are still fresh in people’s
minds, and the turmoil in Wallis and
Futuna between chiefly families
spilled over into New Caledonia in
September (pir, 23 Sept 2005; NC,
23 Sept 2005). 
In foreign affairs, the country
nurtured its relationship with the
Pacific Forum, in which it has
observer status. New Caledonia has
sought improved trade relations since
President Marie-Noëlle Thémereau
(of the ae) and her delegation
406 the contemporary pacific • 18:2 (2006)
attended the Forum summit the previ-
ous August. Her government is seri-
ously considering joining the Pacific
Island Countries Trade Agreement
(picta) and working with the Pacific
Agreement on Closer Economic Rela-
tions (pacer), since several Forum
members, notably Fiji, have shown
interest in exporting to the French
Pacific market, where the income
levels (and prices) are higher than in
most neighboring countries (pir, 19
Jan 2005). In July, a Forum delegation
visited New Caledonia to see how
progress was going under the Noumea
Accord. The Forum is considering
creating a new “associate” member-
ship category to help non-sovereign
countries participate more fully.
Thémereau concluded afterwards that
“they wish us to become part of the
Pacific family” (pir, 27 July 2005).
The associate membership idea was
approved before the French Pacific
observer delegations attended the
summit in Port Moresby in October
(pir, 25 Oct 2005). Thémereau and
New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minis-
ter Phil Goff also exchanged visits,
discussing not only ongoing trade, as
New Zealand exports goods worth
nz$290 million a year to New Cale-
donia, but also tourism and educa-
tional exchanges, and Thémereau
showed interest in New Zealand’s
social programs and teaching of
indigenous languages (pir, 29 March
2005; NC, 31 March 2005; kol, 5
July 2005). Australia is also a major
exporter of goods to New Caledonia,
worth a$205 million annually, and
significant tourism and investment
link the two countries (NC, 20 Sept
2005). New Caledonia also nurtured
relations with Vanuatu, with whom it
is negotiating their maritime borders;
hundreds of ni-Vanuatu enter New
Caledonia every year as contract
workers or students, and two Cale-
donian government ministers visited
Santo in May (pir, 28 Jan, 6 May
2005; NC, 31 Aug 2005).
Independence supporters were not
pleased, however, that when Goff and
the eighty people in his delegation
arrived in New Caledonia, no one
from the Customary Senate partici-
pated in the welcoming ceremony
(kol, 31 March 2005). Worse, when
a Tahitian government minister
addressed a visiting Caledonian trade
delegation in Papeete in October as
being from “Kanaky,” the Caledo-
nians walked out of the meeting in
protest (pir, 3 Oct 2005). Kanak
leaders repeatedly ask the United
Nations to help them decolonize, as
when Manadoué, a former president
of the Customary Senate, attended a
UN meeting in Brisbane in August
and complained that the United
Nations cannot help his people unless
France invites it to do so: “I wish the
UN did have the power to not only
investigate and report but to actually
enforce its findings when a member
state is violating the rights of people
who live within their territories” (pir,
18 Aug 2005). Wamytan, who has
served as head of the Melanesian
Spearhead Group (which recognizes
the flnks as a member), told the
United Nations in October that New
Caledonia is still a colony despite the
Noumea Accord. France helps immi-
gration to New Caledonia without
protecting local employment, and
Kanak young people are growing
more alienated, without much hope
of succeeding in school or getting
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decent jobs, without traditional cul-
tural references, without sufficient
land or housing in semi-urban areas,
without rehabilitation of polluted
nickel mining sites, and without
control over their destiny because
of delays in restricting the electorate.
He urged the United Nations to hold
its next decolonization seminar in
Noumea (pir commentary, 27 Oct
2005).
Militant labor strikes generated the
most drama and headlines during the
year, and much of it was as political
as it was economic. Not only is New
Caledonia the most industrialized
country in the South Pacific outside
Australia and New Zealand, but many
times since the bloody “Events” of the
1980s, labor strikes have shut down
significant parts of the local economy
in order to pressure the government
or powerful companies into making
concessions—a kind of “muscular”
direct action that is reminiscent of
the flnks in its heyday and even of
Kanak revolts of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Such strikes often involve
marches, rallies, roadblocks, barri-
cades that shut down offices or facto-
ries, and other forms of physical or
psychological intimidation, which,
like guerrilla warfare, can threaten
or inconvenience many innocent
bystanders. For example, from late
December 2004 until early February
2005, the firefighters at Tontouta air-
port struck for fifty days over issues
of overtime pay and details in their
statute as public employees. Hundreds
of flights were delayed or missed their
connections, costing the carriers and
the government millions of francs,
while strikers still got paid for emer-
gency duty (NC, 15 Jan, 10 Feb 2005).
Most other strikes were more political
in nature, especially concerning the
protection of local hiring, which
elected officials have still not enacted
into law seven years after the Noumea
Accord. As Rosine Streeter of the
Syndicat Liberté Unité Action (slua)
argued, “It is thanks to the unions
that Caledonia evolves” (kol, 12 Jan
2006). In February, the Syndicat des
Ouvriers et Employés de la Nouvelle-
Calédonie (soenc) stopped all flights
to the outer islands, both for residents
and tourists, because the domestic
carrier Air Calédonie hired a metro-
politan Frenchman as its technical
director on a contract of undeter-
mined duration. After negotiations,
the union won the concession that
the new director would train a local
replacement as soon as possible (NC,
2 Feb 2005). In April, the Union
Syndicale des Travailleurs Kanak et
Exploités (ustke) and the Federation
of Civil Servants shut down the muni-
cipal government in Thio because it
had hired a metropolitan Frenchman
as secretary-general, and slua did so
in Poum for the same reason.
In a letter to the French high com-
missioner ustke wrote, “The country
must build itself with people from the
country,” and Streeter said, “The cur-
rent adjunct secretary-general is a
young man from Poum. Why was this
job not given to him?” Emmanuel
Daye, the Kanak mayor of Poum,
answered that the locals who applied
were not qualified enough, and the
adjunct needed more training himself.
But the Frenchman who was hired
resigned after a week, calling himself
a victim of politics. High Commis-
sioner Constantin called such strike
actions “a form of racism,” but slua
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threatened to continue the shutdown
if Daye’s threat to punish the strikers
was carried out (NC, 23 April, 27
April, 28 April 2005). In Thio, the
strike caused dissension among pro-
independence parties on the municipal
council, as Palika and the uc refused
to support Mayor Albert Moindou of
the Union Progressiste Mélanésienne
(upm), so the mayor called for new
elections (NC, 10 April, 13 April, 12
May 2005). Alan Song, the territorial
minister of public services, called such
strike actions “a little premature,”
because, like other “laws of the coun-
try,” a proposed law on local hiring
still had to be presented to the French
Council of State for approval before
the local Congress could vote on it.
Meanwhile, he said, the quality of
technical personnel in territorial or
municipal government should not be
sacrificed before enough Caledonians
were trained to replace metropolitans
(NC, 22 April 2005). In November,
the Council of State rejected the dis-
criminatory wording of the proposed
new law, so Song’s team had to pre-
pare a new version, which he said
would reserve over 90 percent of
territorial government jobs for locals
by creating two tracks in the civil
service examination (NC, 6 Jan 2006).
In May, ustke called a twenty-four-
hour general strike in support of local
hiring and led a 3,000-person march
in Noumea. Gerard Jodar, its presi-
dent, said, “ustke has been strug-
gling for the defense of local employ-
ment preference since the 1980s. Since
then several agreements have been
signed, including the Noumea Accord,
recognizing a number of work-related
principles, but we are still to see the
effects of these. . . . This country’s
companies have to start training
locals, this would go a long way
toward balancing tomorrow’s society”
(pir, 23 May 2005). Song proposed
new legal criteria for government
recognition of labor unions, based on
a minimum vote by at least 5 percent
of the personnel in elections for union
leaders, in priority over previous rules
based on number of members, inde-
pendence of leadership, dues paid,
experience, and longevity (which now
would be two years minimum). His
plan would cancel the “representativ-
ity” of five out of ten labor unions in
the country (NC, 24 Aug 2005). In
November, three territorial civil ser-
vants unions went on strike, as 1,500
marchers protested against proposed
reforms in their benefits package,
which Song said was deeply in the
red (NC, 3–4 Nov 2005).
Three other major strike actions
affected the nickel industry, namely
the Société Le Nickel (sln) plant at
Doniambo, the proposed inco of
Canada project at Goro/Prony in the
South, and the proposed Falconbridge
of Canada project at Koniambo in the
North. The sln has dominated nickel
mining in New Caledonia for over a
century, and when its Director-Gen-
eral Philippe Vecten was promoted
in March to director of strategy for
Eramet, the sln parent holding com-
pany, he noted that the sln was “in a
phase of very important investments,”
notably the expansion of production
at its Doniambo processing plant out-
side Noumea to 75,000 metric tons
a year and of its mine at Tiebaghi,
which would get a new enrichment
plant. He also voiced the often-heard
opinion that if the proposed process-
ing plant in the North at Koniambo is
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not built by Falconbridge, as planned
by the provincial government, the
sln would resume ownership of the
site and build a plant of its own
there. For that reason, Eramet had
requested a second feasibility study
of Koniambo, since Falconbridge was
running up against a deadline set by
the Accord of Bercy in 1998 (NC, 29
March, 12 April 2005).
The nemesis of the sln in 2005
was Sylvain Nea, a veteran union
leader who wanted to establish his
new Confédération Syndicale des
Travailleurs de Nouvelle-Calédonie
(cstnc) in the nickel industry, among
other sectors. In September, he block-
aded the labor-troubled Surf Hotel,
forcing its owners to close down and
relocate clients, and arousing the ire
of Union Syndicale des Ouvriers et
Employés de la Nouvelle-Calédonie
(usoenc), which regarded the hotel
as its turf (NC, 12 Sept 2005). That
same month, five cstnc agents
blocked access to the electrical power
grid of the Doniambo plant, claiming
that it needed new safety measures
because workers had had electrical
accidents; the sln denied the area
was unsafe, but some workers told
their story of dangers to the local
press. Perhaps it was not a coinci-
dence that elections for union leaders
were coming up? Nea continued his
blockade and expanded it to the
docks at Thio and Kouaoua, key
sources of nickel ore for Doniambo,
causing the sln to warn of layoffs
and shutting down furnaces, and
provoking a demonstration by soenc,
the second largest union at Doniambo
(NC, 7 Oct, 13–14 Oct 2005). The
government labor board authorized
the firing of two cstnc workers at
the Surf and two more at the sln, to
prevent what it called “kamikaze
operations” (NC, 18 Oct 2005), but
Nea’s union won 18 out of 26 union
posts in the sln workers’ board
election, gaining majorities in four
interior mining sites, while Didier
Guenant-Jeanson’s soenc (a member
of usoenc) held a 4 to 3 edge in the
Doniambo plant and condemned
cstnc “illegal” tactics.
Nea announced a protest march 
in support of his activists threatened
with firing (NC, 22 Oct 2005), and in
November, he organized an “unlim-
ited strike” on their behalf, despite
pleas by the government for a negoti-
ated agreement, creating roadblocks
along the access roads to Doniambo
that caused what the press called
“monstrous” traffic bottlenecks in
greater Noumea. The cstnc also shut
down bread bakeries and hindered
garbage collection (NC, 14–15 Nov
2005). A court ordered the union to
lift its blockades, to no avail, and the
sln warned that it had only ten more
days of ore supplies (pir, 16 Nov
2005). sln Director of Human
Resources Andre Moulin proposed
firing the two cstnc workers in ques-
tion and relocating them to other
operations, so Nea’s men roughed
him up, threw him out of his own
office, and damaged his car. “We are
in the right and rules must be the
same for everyone,” Nea told the
press. “There is nothing to make a
fuss about.” usoenc disagreed, as 
did the employers association, which
sided with the sln (NC, 17 Nov
2005). Nea insisted that his workers
be reinstated without conditions and
set up more roadblocks in the center
of Noumea, but the territorial cabinet
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confirmed the firings, with four votes
from the ae, Palika, and uc ministers.
The three rpcr ministers abstained,
revealingly, considering that in
November 2000 Lafleur had rewarded
Nea’s wildcat strikers (then of soenc)
with big pay increases after they chal-
lenged a laboriously negotiated social
pact among unions and employers
(NC, 18 Nov 2005). The ae accused
the rpcr of complicity, claiming that
Jean-Claude Briault informed Pierre
Maresca of what the cabinet was dis-
cussing, who then told Nea. Maresca
retorted that provincial President
Gomès was a “usurper” and warned
the ae, “You control nothing.” The
ae government hesitated to use force
for fear that cstnc would call in min-
ing transporters to besiege Noumea
(NC, 19 Nov 2005). The sln, losing
money fast, offered to reintegrate the
two workers, but only in late 2007—
an offer that Nea rejected, demanding
the first day in 2006 instead. Noumea
was inundated with marches by
employers, soenc, and the cstnc,
until French Interior Minister Nicolas
Sarkozy told the high commissioner
to use troops (NC, 22–30 Nov 2005).
In early December, French Mobile
Guards liberated gas stations and the
main highways, but Nea redirected
his strikers to shut down four banks
in Noumea, while sympathizers in the
St Louis tribe set up their own road-
block. “We will not lower our arms,”
Nea vowed (NC, 1–2 Dec 2005). The
sln finally agreed to reintegrate the
two workers in late February 2006,
but they would be relocated to
another mining site after more train-
ing. Nea himself had to stand trial
(NC, 3 Dec, 8 Dec 2005).
The inco nickel plant project at
Goro had been halted in 2002 after
massive protests by environmentalists,
Kanak customary leaders, and sup-
porters of local employment (Horo-
witz 2004), but the new ae govern-
ment encouraged inco to start up
again. France also granted inco
us$500 million in tax breaks for
2004, and it decreased its own share
of the capital ownership slightly in
order to increase New Caledonia’s
share to 10 percent. In early 2005,
inco planned to allow Japanese firms
(Sumitomo and Mitsui) to buy a 21
percent share in the project, since
Japan buys most of the territory’s
processed nickel, and it agreed to
award us$40 million in contracts to
local companies in the construction
(pir, 5 Jan 2005; NC, 15 Jan 2005).
But Raphaël Mapou’s Yate-based
Rhéébù Nùù committee, backed by
the flnks, voiced concerns about
pollution of local waters and blocked
the site in February. Gomès had the
police reopen the site at the request
of the Kanak customary leaders in
Djubea. Mapou and Andre Vama of
Rhéébù Nùù were convicted of illegal
acts and received suspended sentences
with fines (kol, 7 Feb 2005; NC, 5
Feb, 11 May 2005). At his trial,
Mapou argued that the barricade was
a last resort, after efforts to negotiate
for an independent assessment of the
environmental impact of using chemi-
cals like sulfuric acid and of dumping
manganese into local waters were
rejected by inco. The government
countered that the Southern Province
had already promised to monitor the
pollution issue closely, and the area’s
customary leaders had approved the
project (kol, 13 April 2005; NC, 3 Feb
2005; TP, 15 Feb 2005). Yet in May,
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the South finally agreed to have a
nongovernmental environmental
impact study done on Goro, since
Rhéébù Nùù had shown that the
effluent would contain 100 times
more pollution than European Union
standards authorized. inco ceo Scott
Hand said he hoped to avoid having
to build an additional furnace to dis-
pose of the manganese runoff, since
it would pollute the atmosphere! (NC,
3 May 2005).
In July a coalition of unions, cus-
tomary leaders, environmental
groups, and politicians supported a
demand from Rhéébù Nùù that inco
cease to seek exemptions from taxa-
tion and environmental standards,
and Gomès voiced concern that inco
was not heeding the recommendations
made by the Southern Province. Even
High Commissioner Constantin said,
“inco is lying to everybody” (kol,
11 July 2005). inco wanted to
require workers to put in sixty hours
a week during the construction phase,
and to hire 4,000 foreign workers,
mostly Filipino (NC, 21 Aug 2005;
pir, 7 Sept 2005). By November, a
Noumea court voided an inco per-
mit to research the Prony nickel
deposit near Goro, something that
the Lafleur government had done in
defiance of an earlier court annul-
ment. The new government objected
to “giving away” such a valuable ore
vein without proper consultation (NC,
14 Oct 2005; pir, 22 Nov 2005).
inco did not escape the year without
another blockade in December, this
time by ustke and Mapou’s new
Caugern (Indigenous Committee to
Manage Natural Resources), to put
pressure on France to give its final
approval to the Falconbridge project
in the North. All access roads and the
port were closed, so that inco had to
relocate its personnel from Goro to
Noumea (NC, 14–15 Dec 2005). The
police finally liberated the site again
and put two arsonists in prison (NC,
16 Dec, 23 Dec, 28 Dec 2005). inco
announced that in January 2006 the
first Filipino “specialists” would
arrive to begin constructing the Goro
nickel plant (NC, 22 Dec 2005).
The Northern Province nickel
plant has been talked about for over
thirty years in New Caledonia, but it
took on new importance after the
Matignon Accord of 1988 promised
efforts to rebalance the local economy
so that Noumea did not control all
the wealth. In the Bercy Accord of
1998, France agreed to let Falcon-
bridge work with the Northern Prov-
ince government (which would retain
51 percent ownership, unlike the
South’s tiny share of Goro) to develop
a nickel processing plant. The accord
also said the Société Minerale Sud
Pacifique (smsp), which Lafleur had
sold to the North, could acquire the
title to the Koniambo mining site from
the sln, in exchange for the smaller
vein at Poum and additional compen-
sation, so long as Falconbridge made
its final decision, after initial research,
by the end of 2005. In February,
Falconbridge announced it needed
another eleven months to decide
because of rising costs, but Paul
Neaoutyine, president of the North,
assured his government, “The North-
ern factory, it’s no longer a project,
it’s a reality” (NC, 12 Feb, 4 Feb
2005). Andre Dang, smsp president,
announced cost-cutting economies
such as postponing the hydroelectric
dam at Pouembout in order to finance
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the Northern plant, showing how
important it was to Kanak aspirations
for providing job opportunities for
young people and “national” income
for independence (NC, 11 Feb 2005;
Horowitz 2004). The North even
hired archeologists to make sure the
construction would not destroy
ancient artifacts, since it took pride in
the site where Lapita pottery was first
found and wanted to make it a tourist
attraction (NC, 30 March 2005).
In late March, however, ustke
organized a demonstration in Noumea
against recent developments in the
two new nickel plant projects. It pro-
tested against what it said was a cam-
paign by the sln to get Koniambo
back by claiming that Falconbridge
had failed to deliver, and against the
lack of an independent environmental
study of the Goro project (TP, 31
March 2005). In June, the North
announced that one of the two condi-
tions in the Bercy Accord had been
fulfilled, that a feasibility study had
proven the project bankable; the
second condition remained, that the
North commit us$100 million by the
end of 2005. In July, Overseas Minis-
ter Baroin confirmed that France had
made the project a top priority by
approving tax rebates of us$620 mil-
lion for construction of a power sta-
tion. Falconbridge predicted a total
cost of us$2.3 billion to create the
nickel-processing plant, port, and
increased mining output at Koniambo,
while the South hoped to have Goro
fully operational by 2007 for us$1.8
billion (NC, 9 June 2005; pir, 20 July
2005). A new complication arose in
October, as inco offered to improve
the “synergy” of both projects by
buying Falconbridge, thereby creating
the largest nickel company in the
world, but the US government threat-
ened an antitrust investigation, since
both firms listed their stocks on Wall
Street, so the offer was postponed for
sixty days, even though the pressure
was building for Falconbridge to
make its final decision (kol, 12 Oct
2005; NC, 13 Oct, 22 Nov 2005; pir,
16 Nov 2005). In late November,
ustke organized a general strike to
protest a condition that the French
State wanted to impose on the Koni-
ambo deal, namely that if it ran into
financial difficulty, the State would
confiscate 98 percent of smsp’s divi-
dends—a clause that banks refused to
risk underwriting. “We are going to
war, and I am weighing my words,”
vowed Jodar (NC, 24–25 Nov 2005).
France gave an ultimatum to
Falconbridge to take it or leave it,
so Falconbridge considered bypassing
the State and financing the project by
itself, with the Northern Province
borrowing its share from Falcon-
bridge and repaying it with most of
the province’s dividends over many
years. Falconbridge said that the sln
was lobbying the State strongly in
order to regain Koniambo; yet it also
admitted that if it merged with inco,
Goro would be built first (NC, 26
Nov, 2 Dec 2005). In December,
1,500 protesters demonstrated in
Noumea against what they regarded
as the French bid to undermine the
Northern plant (rnzi, 11 Dec 2005),
and Falconbridge decided to bypass
the State, with the approval of
Neaoutyine, a leader of Palika-uni
(NC, 12 Dec, 15 Dec 2005). ustke,
however, was less optimistic and
maintained the pressure. Jodar
warned that the new arrangement
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would indebt the Northern Province
for a long period, in an age when
multinationals use debt to keep small
countries under their control while
they loot their resources. ustke
camped out in front of the French
High Commission and coordinated
with other unions and protest groups
to blockade Goro, strike at Tontouta
Airport, and slow down trash pickups
and gas distributions, while oppo-
nents erected their own roadblocks in
counter-protest (NC, 15 Dec, 17 Dec
2005). On 24 December, the smsp
decided to construct the Northern
nickel plant with Falconbridge, who
would completely finance the project
with help from the smsp dividends,
while the State approved smsp acqui-
sition of title to Koniambo. The sln
would receive title to Poum, but only
after Eramet had lost its court battle
to retain Koniambo. It remained to
be seen if inco would buy Falcon-
bridge (NC, 24 Dec, 27 Dec, 28 Dec
2005). Louis Kotra Uregei, former
ustke president, argued that it was
his union’s pressure that forced
France to assure Jodar that it would
support the Northern plant’s con-
struction by smsp and Falconbridge,
including key financial contributions
and guarantees. Neaoutyine, Uregei
said, had his own vision of how to
solicit from France what Kanaky
wanted (kol, 7 Jan 2006). The North
likes to negotiate patiently but relent-
lessly, while the unions keep up the
pressure. 
david chappell
References
Horowitz, Leah. 2004. Toward a Viable
Independence? The Koniambo Project and
the Political Economy of Mining in New
Caledonia. The Contemporary Paciﬁc
16:287–319.
kol, Kanaky Online. <http://fr.groups
.yahoo.com/group/kanaky>
NC, Les Nouvelles-Calédoniennes. Daily.
Noumea. <http://www.info.Inc.nc/
caledonie>
pir, Pacific Islands Report.
<http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport>
ran, Radio Australia News, Pacific Beat.
<http://www.abc.net.au/ra>
rnzi, Radio New Zealand International.
<http://www.rnzi.com>
TP, Tahiti-Presse. Daily. Papeete.
<http://www.tahitipresse.pf> 
Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea solidified its posi-
tion in the region in 2005 by hosting
the Melanesian Spearhead Group
meeting in Goroka as well as the
Pacific Islands Forum in Port Moresby.
Both of these meetings were held in
the month of October. Despite its rep-
utation as one of the most dangerous
countries to visit, many regional lead-
ers were impressed by the beauty of
Papua New Guinea and its people.
More significantly, Papua New
Guinea celebrated thirty years of inde-
pendence as a sovereign state. Many
commentators noted that this journey
has not always been pleasant, mainly
due to the declining state of the econ-
omy, infrastructure, and the provision
of basic services such as health and
education. However, Papua New
Guinea stands out as one of the few
former colonies that have managed to
maintain democracy. There have been
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a few challenges to democratic rule in
Papua New Guinea but constitutional
rule has always triumphed in the end.
This is particularly notable given the
social and cultural diversity of the
country.
Papua New Guinea has developed
a political culture of surprise and
unpredictability. The year began with
the idea of a grand coalition pro-
posed by Prime Minister Sir Michael
Somare. On the 31 December 2005
“Year in Review” program on em tv
news (Papua New Guinea’s national
television service), Somare announced
that his party, the National Alliance
(na), would go into a grand coalition
with the Peoples National Congress
(pnc), a party founded by Bill Skate
but later led by Peter O’Neil. The
proposal emerged from the events of
2004, when the parliamentary system
fell into chaos as a result of members
of Parliament testing the new Organic
Law on Integrity of Political Parties
and Candidates.
Somare’s grand coalition idea did
not go down well with members of
his own party. Don Polye, the deputy
leader of the National Alliance–High-
lands Region, argued strongly that
taking the Peoples National Congress
on board would further weaken the
Opposition, and that the current
ministers were performing exception-
ally well. A veteran of thirty years in
politics, Somare knew that his grand
coalition was unlikely to happen, like
similar initiatives that had foundered
in the past.
Three deputy prime ministers had
been dumped in 2004, and by April
2005 no new appointment had been
made. mp Luther Wenge, the gover-
nor of Morobe Province, criticized
Somare in Parliament for not acting
on this (PNG Post-Courier, 21 April
2005). At the end of May, Wenge
asked the court to declare that Somare
was constitutionally bound to appoint
a deputy to fill the position, which
had been vacant for twelve months
(PNG Post-Courier, 30 May 2005).
In February 2005, Sir Bill Skate
(who died in January 2006 after suf-
fering heart failure) decided to leave
the Peoples National Congress he had
founded, and join the middle benches
to support the government on its ini-
tiatives. Sir Bill stated that the time to
play petty politics was over and that
he would concentrate on helping his
electorate and the government.
A Supreme Court reference was
withdrawn by Chief Ombudsman Ila
Geno, after he questioned the legality
of a five-month adjournment of Par-
liament (National, 22 April 2005).
Geno went to court after the govern-
ment, faced with an imminent vote of
no confidence, adjourned Parliament
from 21 January to 29 June 2004.
Geno argued that the adjournment
breached the constitutional require-
ment that Parliament sit for at least
sixty-three days. He withdrew the
order after Parliament made up for
the days that had been missed. The
long adjournment of Parliament is a
tactic used by governments to avoid
votes of no confidence that have
become the norm in Papua New
Guinea politics.
In a workshop organized by the
Institute of National Affairs on the
theme “Understanding Reforms,” two
national academics, Dr David Kava-
namur and Dr Henry Okole, argued
that the reforms actually undertaken
by successive governments provided
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the least benefit to the economy, while
the ones promising the greatest
benefits were avoided. The academics
concluded that election years coincide
with budget blowouts because public
funds are deliberately channeled to
end up in the hands of members of
Parliament and political parties. They
also pointed out that many politicians
abandon reform packages in order to
get reelected; that members of coali-
tion governments can force a prime
minister to jeopardize reform efforts;
that there was often excessive opti-
mism about the expected outcomes of
reforms; and that many reform efforts
failed to take into account the likeli-
hood of resistance from those nega-
tively affected (National, 23 March
2005). Allan Patience, professor of
politics at the University of Papua
New Guinea (upng), argued that
there was a long way to go before
real reform could take place in Papua
New Guinea. Despite efforts to insti-
tute reforms, the country has a poor
record of economic growth and is
ranked very low in global indicators
of human development (National,
23 March 2005).
In May 2005, the prime minister
announced that members of Parlia-
ment would receive a pay raise due to
increases in the cost of living (PNG
Post-Courier, 6 May 2005). It has
become common for members to
receive pay increases every year, while
public servants are told that the econ-
omy cannot afford raises for them.
The pay award would be considered
by the Salaries Remuneration Com-
mittee, which is chaired by the
Speaker of Parliament and includes
others who would benefit from the
pay raise. Meanwhile, the Women
Doctor’s Association started a fund-
raising drive to collect 10 million kina
to replace the country’s only radio-
therapy machine capable of detecting
cancer, which broke down a decade
ago. The government has not com-
mitted to assisting this very impor-
tant cause.
The public service was beset by a
number of controversies during the
year. The first arose after incumbent
Attorney General Francis Damen’s
contract expired in January 2005, and
State Solicitor Isikiel Mesulam was
appointed to act in the position.
Damen questioned the appointment
(PNG Post-Courier, 19 Jan, 20 Jan,
21 Jan 2005), contending that proper
procedures had not been followed. He
also pointed out that Mesulam was
under police investigation regarding a
videotape allegedly containing porno-
graphic materials. Mesulam was even-
tually convicted for producing the
video, and the appointment of a new
attorney general was postponed.
The Foreign Affairs Department
also came under fire from politicians
for encouraging corruption, especially
in its Immigration Division. Two staff
members from that division were sus-
pended after one received money for
processing illegal working permits for
foreigners, and the other was accused
of issuing seventy-eight illegal visas
(PNG Post-Courier, 6 May 2005).
The Public Accounts Committee
(pac) raised questions about the
appointment of the auditor general,
because the National Executive Coun-
cil had apparently ignored the pac
recommendation and appointed some-
one whose name was not even on the
shortlist (National, 25 Feb 2005).
This appointment was also criticized
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by Kevin Pamba in his weekly news-
paper column. He noted that many of
those appointed to senior positions in
the public service were from the prime
minister’s province, East Sepik, result-
ing in what Pamba termed “the Sepik
Tsunami” (National, 8 March 2005).
A similar avalanche of appointments
of people from one part of the coun-
try had occurred during the term of
Prime Minister Bill Skate. 
The Public Accounts Committee
also uncovered massive fraud and
corruption activity in the Public Cura-
tor’s office. The committee stated that
this office did not maintain proper
accounting records for the millions of
kina in assets of deceased people for
which it was responsible (National,
14 April 2005). According to pac
Chairman John Hickey, “We are
dealing with a very serious matter of
theft, misappropriation, mismanage-
ment and fraud of deceased estates
and a thorough investigation needs to
be carried out” (PNG Post-Courier,
14 April 2005). 
In February 2005, the government
began preparations for the historic
election on Bougainville that would
pave the way for a new Autonomous
Bougainville Government (abg). The
process began with the review of elec-
toral boundaries in Bougainville sup-
ported by the Papua New Guinea
Electoral Commission (National, 3
Feb 2005). A high-powered bipartisan
committee led by Inter-Government
Relations Minister Sir Peter Barter
held talks with senior members of the
Bougainville administration. The
issues discussed included Francis
Ona’s Me‘ekamui movement and their
“no-go zones”; rehabilitation of dis-
trict administration centers, roads,
and communication systems; peace
and reconciliation; weapons disposal;
and the elections (PNG Post-Courier,
21 Feb 2005). The committee also
met with the South Bougainville
Council of Elders. This visit began a
close working relationship between
the national government and the
Bougainville leaders toward the insti-
tution of the autonomous government
in Bougainville.
In preparation for the election,
scheduled to begin on 20 May, work
on the common roll started in March.
Many of the new enrollments were
from the no-go zones, indicating peo-
ple’s willingness to participate in the
political process. Ten international
observers from the United Nations,
the Commonwealth, the Pacific Islands
Forum Secretariat, as well as Aus-
tralia, Japan, and New Zealand were
invited to monitor the elections.
Leader of the Opposition Peter
O’Neil challenged the idea that Bou-
gainville should get autonomy, claim-
ing that there would be chaos and
fragmentation if other provinces were
to follow the precedent. O’Neil him-
self was pushing for the National
Capital District to be given the status
of a province (National, 1 March
2005), and leaders from East New
Britain Province were adamant that
the arrangement given to Bougainville
should also be given to them. Never-
theless, they have pledged total loyalty
to the government of Papua New
Guinea.
A few months before the elections
Francis Ona, who had initiated the
crisis in 1988, made public appear-
ances in Arawa and Buka. Ona had
been living in the no-go zone for six-
teen years and this was the first time
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that he had come out of hiding. Dur-
ing his first day in public he reiterated
that Bougainville was independent,
that there was no need for autonomy
and elections, and that Australia was
not welcome in Bougainville (PNG
Post-Courier, 23 March 2005). Gov-
ernor for Bougainville John Momis
expressed regret over Ona’s call to
remove Australian and Papua New
Guinea police from Bougainville, and
argued that the people of Bougainville
were committed to the peace agree-
ment and wanted the autonomous
government election to be held with-
out delay, so that they could deal with
the issues of good governance, devel-
opment, security, and the efficient
provision of services (PNG Post-
Courier, 24 March 2005).
By April, it became clear that John
Momis, the longest-serving regional
member for Bougainville, would
resign his seat in Parliament and con-
test the elections for the Autonomous
Bougainville Government. His princi-
ple opponent was Joseph Kabui, who
had been the provincial premier when
the crisis began. In an emotional
atmosphere in Parliament, Prime
Minister Sir Michael Somare fought
back tears to farewell John Momis
after thirty-three years of service.
Describing him as a visionary leader
who always followed his beliefs,
Somare praised Momis for his efforts
in shaping the national constitution,
and helping him bring democracy to
Papua New Guinea. Momis told
Parliament that he had always
believed that power and decision
making should be brought closer to
the people.
abg voting started on Friday, 20
May 2005. The polling was peaceful
and many members of the Me‘ekamui
faction also took part in the voting.
According to the leader of the team of
international observers, Ratu Epeli
Nai-Lati Kau, the election was well
prepared and well conducted. With
the wide publicity, the process was
credible and those who participated
were motivated to vote freely
(National, 30 May 2005).
On 5 June, Joseph Kabui was
declared the duly elected abg presi-
dent. Kabui polled 37,928 votes, beat-
ing rival Momis, who polled 23,861.
Soon after the declaration of the
presidential winner, Momis disputed
the election results and expressed his
desire to seek legal advice. Momis
claimed that there had been massive
foul play, especially in Central and
South Bougainville, where people
voted more than once. Also, the
number of voters did not correspond
with the number of eligible voters on
the common roll. However, Momis
withdrew his official complaint in
July (National, 22 July 2005), a move
that was welcomed by many on
Bougainville.
A chapter in the recent history of
Bougainville came to a close on 24
July when Francis Ona, the self-styled
leader of the Me‘ekamui Republic,
died suddenly in his village. Ona’s
death will eventually result in a new
sense of direction for Bougainville.
But this will come slowly, and only
after his followers realize that the only
option is to work with the Autono-
mous Bougainville Government and
President Kabui to bring lasting peace
to the island.
Toward the end of the year it was
discovered that a number of Fijians,
mostly former military officers, were
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in Bougainville at the invitation of
Noah Musingku, the head of a failed
money-making scheme called U-Vis-
tract. Apparently Musingku did not
trust Bougainvillians and had
attempted to recruit individuals from
other parts of Papua New Guinea, as
well as Fiji and Solomon Islands, for
this scheme (PNG Post-Courier, 13
Dec 2005). The Fijians were said to
be carrying out military exercises at
Tonu in the Siwai District, South
Bougainville (PNG Post-Courier,
9 Dec 2005). At the end of the year
efforts continued to expel them.
Papua New Guinea took a further
step in cementing its ties with Japan
through a high-powered ministerial
visit to Japan led by the prime min-
ister and a number of his senior min-
isters. The prime minister met with
Japanese leaders, including politicians,
business leaders, and the emperor.
During this historic visit, Papua New
Guinea expressed its continued sup-
port for Japan in international forums.
According to Prime Minister Somare,
Japan has the market and technology
while Papua New Guinea is blessed
with the abundant natural resource
and agricultural potential to supply
the Japanese market. Japan is Papua
New Guinea’s second largest aid
donor, providing some 120 million
kina annually.
In March 2005, the government
also signed a treaty with the Solomon
Islands government to enhance devel-
opment efforts in the region. The
treaty was in line with the long-term
objective to assist Solomon Islands
and to strengthen shared “Melanesian
principles.” Papua New Guinea also
established closer ties with Fiji
through trade promotion between the
two countries. Fiji’s foreign affairs
and external trade minister described
Papua New Guinea as a “Pacific
Tiger” in terms of trade and economic
development (PNG Post-Courier, 16
March 2005).
Diplomatic relations between
Australia and Papua New Guinea 
hit bottom when Prime Minister 
Sir Michael Somare was searched by
security personnel at the Brisbane air-
port. Somare was on his way back to
the country after a meeting in Auck-
land with leaders from other Pacific
countries. On his return to Papua
New Guinea, Somare expressed con-
cern about the treatment he received,
and there were numerous public
protests in Port Moresby and Lae.
A petition was delivered to the Aus-
tralian High Commission in Port
Moresby, and High Commissioner
Michael Potts was summoned to the
Foreign Affairs Department (National,
30 March 2005). However, the Aus-
tralian government refused to make
an official apology, stating that this
was a routine check. In response, the
PNG government cancelled a high-
level meeting between the two coun-
tries on an aid package to Papua New
Guinea.
Despite calls by members of Parlia-
ment such as Luther Wenge to sever
relations, the Australian government
allocated an estimated a$492 million
(1.247 billion kina) to Papua New
Guinea as official development assis-
tance for 2005–2006. Aid for Papua
New Guinea and Solomon Islands
comes under a new Australian gov-
ernment policy known as the “fragile
states” initiative, which seeks to con-
solidate aid, security, economic, and
political aspects of the relationship.
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Australian Foreign Affairs Minister
Alexander Downer said Papua New
Guinea and Solomon Islands demon-
strated the problems facing “fragile
states”—a shift from the “failed
state” label Australian politicians,
journalists, and analysts have often
used to describe the two countries
(PNG Post-Courier, 12 May 2005).
A new era of cooperation between
Papua New Guinea and Australia
resulted in the implementation of the
Enhancement Cooperation Program
(ecp), an aid package of 2 billion kina
(a$800 million), fully funded by the
Australian government. An important
aspect of this program was the utiliza-
tion of Australian police officers to
work alongside their PNG counter-
parts. This program was welcomed by
the residents of Port Moresby, who
for the first time saw Australian Fed-
eral Police (afp) officers patrolling the
streets with their PNG counterparts.
The police minister urged PNG police
officers to work closely with the Aus-
tralian police. Despite the deployment
of the Australian assisting police in
Port Moresby, crimes such as armed
robbery, car theft, and assault contin-
ued to increase in the city (National,
7 April 2005). The increase in these
crimes is attributed to the fact people
feel that they will be treated more
nicely when arrested by the Australian
assisting police than by Papua New
Guinean police officers.
By April there were signs of dis-
content with the assistance package
among Papua New Guinea police
officers. aid Watch, an activist group
monitoring Australian overseas aid
and trade policies, reported that a
very small portion of the ecp money
would actually be used to combat law
and order problems in the country
(PNG Post-Courier, 28 April 2005).
According to the group, of the a$800
million (2 billion kina) funding, the
amount for salaries and accommoda-
tions for the Australian Federal Police
was a$339.8 million (871.28 million
kina), while a$394.59 million (1 bil-
lion kina) was for afp logistics and
operational costs. The report revealed
that the Australian Federal Police
would spend a$734.41 million (1.9
billion kina) on themselves, while
technical assistance for the Royal
Papua New Guinea Constabulary
amounted to only a$55.7 million (143
million kina) (PNG Post-Courier, 28
April 2005). This information led to
a series of meetings held by police
officers in Port Moresby. The differ-
ences in the working conditions of
local police officers and their afp
counterparts also came under fire in
Parliament. Members of Parliament
pointed out that Australian and local
officers might clash (PNG Post-
Courier, 29 April 2005).
In another major blow to the pro-
gram, PNG security officers accused
the Australian assisting police of con-
ducting surveillance and intelligence
gathering on Papua New Guinea
under the guise of the Enhancement
Cooperation Program (National, 29
April 2005). They also claimed that
the Australian police had installed a
satellite link at the operation room at
the Boroko Police Station without the
approval of the police commissioner.
In early May, following a meeting
attended by 300 police officers, an
ultimatum was given to the police
commissioner to remove the Aus-
tralian assisting police from the coun-
try. Responding to the ultimatum, the
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prime minister called for a review to
ensure that the ecp policing com-
ponent was working effectively
(National, 9 May 2005). However,
the afp review had to wait, pending
the legal challenge to the Enhance-
ment Cooperation Program in the
Supreme Court instituted by the
outspoken Luther Wenge.
On 13 May the Supreme Court
handed down a landmark decision
when it ruled that the use of the Aus-
tralian assisting police in Papua New
Guinea was unconstitutional (PNG
Post-Courier, 16 May 2005). A five-
judge decision led by Chief Justice Sir
Mari Kapi ruled unanimously that
key sections of the ecp Act relating to
the immunity for designated/related
persons were unconstitutional. The
ruling meant that the officers had to
stand down until the two govern-
ments made other arrangements.
Many inside and outside observers
were dismayed by the decision. Sir
Rabbie Namaliu indicated that the
government would make the neces-
sary changes. The Australian foreign
affairs minister expressed his disap-
pointment, but said he would sit with
the PNG government and work out
what could be done next. Minister for
Internal Security Bire Kimisopa, who
was behind Australia’s Enhancement
Cooperation Program from the very
beginning, also expressed his disap-
pointment. Accepting the decision of
the court, the minister stated that
both governments have to go back to
the drawing board. upng Professor
Allan Patience argued that the deci-
sion would rock the very foundations
of PNG–Australia relations and that
the damage could be irreparable
(PNG Post-Courier, 16 May 2005).
Despite the removal of Australian
police officers from the country, other
aspects of the Enhancement Coopera-
tion Program remained in place. Some
Australians were not affected by the
court ruling and continued to work
in various government departments
(National, 20 May 2005).
The discussion of a new ecp
arrangement began immediately after
the court ruling. The police and for-
eign affairs ministers were both com-
mitted to renegotiating the program,
and a cabinet decision gave full
authority to the police minister to
pursue the police aspect of the agree-
ment (National, 12 Aug 2005).
The provision of basic education
has been an ongoing dilemma for the
government. In the Education for All
Global Monitoring Report released by
unesco in 2005, Papua New Guinea
ranked 102 out of 127 countries.
Figures from the 2000 national
census showed that only about 40
percent of the primary school aged
children were attending school at that
time. In March 2005, the PNG Edu-
cation Department launched its
national education plan for the next
ten years. The plan calls for the edu-
cation system to provide children
with skills rather than prepare them
for tertiary education. The policy
deliberately targets the thousands of
young men and women who may not
make it past years 8, 10, and 12, and
who thus often join the growing
unemployment numbers—hopelessly
lost and dependent on parents and
relatives in the cities and towns (PNG
Post-Courier, 17 March 2005).
The tertiary education system was
hit hard in 2005 when the staff and
students at the University of Papua
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New Guinea protested against the
administration of the university. A
work stoppage of two weeks occurred
after staff demands for agreed wage
increases were ignored. The admin-
istration continued its hard-line
approach even after the staff went
back to work. The leaders of the two
staff unions and a number of senior
academics were targeted by the
administration, and nine staff mem-
bers were asked to show cause why
they should not be terminated.
The student protest began in July
and lasted almost a month. Their
demands focused on the grading
system used at the university. The
administration treated the students
the same way that they treated the
staff and this prolonged the protest.
It was only after the intervention of
the acting minister for education that
the students went back to class. The
minister appointed a committee
headed by Dr Thomas Webster,
director of the National Research
Institute, to look into the allegations
made by students and staff.
In February 2005, the Australian
newspaper The Age claimed to have
uncovered links between sixteen of
Papua New Guinea’s most senior
police officers and Asian criminals
implicated in people smuggling,
money laundering, prostitution, illegal
gambling, fraud, and theft. Police
Minister Bire Kimesopa said that the
report was credible and acknowl-
edged the existence of an organized
crime syndicate involving some senior
members of the police force (PNG
Post-Courier, 21 Feb 2005). The min-
ister argued that the growing culture
of corruption in the police force was
a result of past governments not
tackling pressing issues including
housing, pay, communication, logis-
tics, and uniforms (PNG Post-
Courier, 23 Feb 2005).
A highlight of 2005 was the estab-
lishment of a Guns Control Commit-
tee headed by retired General Jerry
Singirok. Traveling to most parts of
the country to collect information,
the committee heard strong calls to
immediately address the problem of
illegal firearms. In Eastern Highlands
Province it was discovered that many
people have been killed during tribal
fights by guns (PNG Post-Courier,
7 March 2005). In Mt Hagen the
committee heard from a guns and
drug dealer that guns are smuggled
into the country in 200-liter gas
bottles and 44-gallon oil drums
(PNG Post-Courier, 4 April 2005).
This informant was ready to reveal
names of more than one hundred
illegal gun buyers.
In the Southern Highlands, the
committee heard that high-powered
weapons were used in tribal fights,
and that every tribe and clan was
amassing guns in preparation for the
2007 elections. The committee was
also told that the leaders themselves
are arming the people. A study con-
ducted by Professor Philip Alpers of
the University of Sydney uncovered
that approximately 2,450 factory-
made firearms were being used by
criminals, tribal fighters, and merce-
nary gunmen to wreak havoc in
Southern Highlands Province. Pro-
fessor Alpers said that most of the
destructive firearms used in crime and
conflict in the province had been sup-
plied by PNG soldiers and police.
The fight by government, civil
society, and foreign donors to address
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the hiv/aids epidemic gained
momentum in 2005. unaids Execu-
tive Director Dr Peter Piot visited the
country and noted that the 3 percent
infection rate was high compared to
other countries in the Pacific and East
Asian region (PNG Post-Courier, 21
Feb 2005). The number of women
getting infected was also high, which
has serious economic and social
implications. Since 2001, more than
half of the 107 teachers who died
while on duty suffered from hiv/aids
(National, 31 May 2005). The
National Superannuation Fund Lim-
ited reported that 90 percent of death
claims relating to hiv/aids were
from the Highlands Region (PNG
Post-Courier, 10 June 2005).
The fight against hiv/aids was
boosted by the establishment of a new
organization called Igat Hope, made
up of people living with the disease.
Dr Banare Bun, chairman of the Par-
liamentary Committee on hiv/aids,
urged people to make it their business
to fight against the disease. Only
when there is talk about sexuality
and reproductive health will society
be able to address the problem (PNG
Post-Courier, 23 Feb 2005). The
Australian government pledged its
continued support to fund the PNG
government’s effort to fight the epi-
demic. AusAID head John Davidson
said hiv/aids was the single biggest
threat to Papua New Guinea (PNG
Post-Courier, 17 March 2005). Two
popular Rugby League players from
Australia, Mal Meninga and Paul
Harragon, visited schools and settle-
ments carrying the messages of the
dangers of the disease in society
(National, 10 May 2005).
A major initiative of the Somare
government was the District Treasury
Roll-out program. The program is
designed to ensure that long-neglected
districts obtain basic government
services such as police, district magis-
trates, banking, and postal services.
By the end of 2005, more than ten
districts throughout the country had
benefited from this program.
The Somare government also
launched the Medium Term Develop-
ment Strategy Plan: 2005–2010. Pro-
moting the government’s program for
recovery and development, the plan
has three interrelated objectives: good
governance, export-driven economic
growth, and rural development and
poverty reduction to be achieved
through empowerment of the people.
It is a product of extensive consulta-
tion with the provincial and local
level governments, the private sector,
community organizations, and ordi-
nary Papua New Guineans (PNG
Post-Courier, 10 March 2005). Prior-
ity areas for the next five years are the
rehabilitation and maintenance of
transport infrastructure, promotion
of income earning opportunities, basic
education, development-oriented
informal adult education, primary
health care, hiv/aids prevention, and
law and justice (PNG Post-Courier,
28 April 2005).
The plan was not without its
critics, and Professor Allan Patience
described it as “a feel good plan”
that did not address many important
issues—including disaster manage-
ment, corruption, globalization,
unemployment, and population
growth—that could have a huge
bearing on the economic and social
prosperity of the country (PNG 
Post-Courier, 9 May 2005).
The forestry sector again came
under scrutiny in 2005. Minister for
political reviews • melanesia 423
Forests Patrick Pruaitch came under
attack by the member for Huon Gulf,
Sasa Zibe. Arguing that the minister
had allowed corrupt practices by
foreign logging firms, Zibe urged
Pruaitch to resign (PNG Post-Courier,
16 March 2005). Pruaitch’s proposed
amendment to the Forestry Act was
opposed by provinces that have log-
ging companies operating in them
(PNG Post-Courier, 5 May 2005).
The governors for Western Province
and Gulf Province argued there was
nothing wrong with the act as it
stands, and that any amendments
must take into account the interests
of the people and not just that of the
government (PNG Post-Courier, 13
May 2005). Members of Parliament
also raised questions about how the
prime minister would reconcile the
proposed amendment with his push
for carbon trading as a solution to
climate change problems. Markham
mp Andrew Baing warned that
amendments to the Forestry Act
would destroy the country’s forest
resources. Despite all the criticisms,
Parliament passed the amendments
during its sitting on 3 August.
A major blow to the forestry sector
was the withdrawal of us$34.4 mil-
lion (112.4 million kina) by the
World Bank for forestry and conser-
vation project in the country. The
loan agreement was designed to help
government force logging companies
to comply with forest and environ-
ment laws (PNG Post-Courier, 23
May 2005).
The Institute of National Affairs
Council reported that it was pleased
with the performance of the economy,
noting that political stability had
encouraged both investment and
consumption (PNG Post-Courier,
16 March 2005). The United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific also praised the
Somare government for maintaining
tight fiscal discipline during 2005,
which resulted in a surplus of 1.1 per-
cent of the gross domestic product
(PNG Post-Courier, 12 May 2005).
In June, the PNG Treasury secre-
tary reported that the economy would
grow by a projected rate of 3.4 per-
cent. The economy had grown by 2.8
percent in 2003 and 2.6 percent in
2004 (National, 5 July 2005). Garth
McIlwain, managing director of the
Bank of the South Pacific, stated that
the PNG economy is experiencing its
best conditions in the thirty years
since independence because of a sense
of maturity in leadership (National,
3 Oct 2005).
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Solomon Islands
By the end of 2005 much of the
public discussion in Solomon Islands
focused on the general election sched-
uled for 5 April 2006. Many people
hoped that this election would bring
in leaders who would steer the coun-
try away from the path it had fol-
lowed in the last twenty-seven years
of constitutional independence. Many
were convinced that poor leadership
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and government policies had con-
tributed to the social unrest and the
subsequent intervention by the
Australian-led Regional Assistance
Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi)
in July 2003.
Governor of the Central Bank Rick
Hou echoed many people’s sentiments
when he said that voters should “elect
honest, trustworthy and leaders of
integrity . . . who can contribute posi-
tively to the welfare of the people and
the country so that we can enjoy a
stable landscape” (Solomon Star, 14
Dec 2005). But while people hoped
for the best from this election, past
experiences indicate that one should
never bet on a favorable election out-
come. For one thing, the election will
be contested under the same electoral
and political party systems used in
the past. Second, the predominant
political culture, which places enor-
mous social and financial demands
on candidates, will continue to influ-
ence both the election process and its
outcome. Unless these change, it is
difficult to see how this election will
be different from previous ones.
The election aside, and like the
previous year, 2005 was dominated
by the continuing struggle to recover
from the social unrest that started in
late 1998 and has since dominated
Solomon Islands political, social, and
economic landscapes. Central to the
recovery process was the work of the
Regional Assistance Mission and
other institutions engaged in strength-
ening the state’s capacity to restore
and maintain law and order, manage
the economy, and provide social ser-
vices. Cohorts of nongovernmental
organizations, foreign governments,
and financial and intergovernmental
institutions joined ramsi in the task
of post-conflict rebuilding. While
these institutions usually captured the
media limelight, there were also many
local communities and individuals
who—even before the ramsi inter-
vention—had been working to restore
order in communities across the coun-
try and rebuild relationships damaged
by the social unrest. These people
continued to contribute to the post-
conflict rebuilding processes.
The year started on a high foreign-
relations note with the historic visit in
early February of Taiwanese President
Chen Shui-bian. He was accompanied
by a huge delegation that consisted of
sixty-nine “high-ranking” government
officials and more than forty media
personnel. President Shui-bian’s visit
marked a milestone in Solomon
Islands–Taiwanese relations and high-
lighted Solomon Islands’ importance
in Taiwan’s push for international
recognition. The Honiara visit was
part of President Shui-bian’s Pacific
Islands tour, aimed at improving
Taiwan’s profile and recognition in
the international arena. With main-
land China’s rapid economic growth
and growing importance as a global
power, it was vital for Taiwan to
ensure that Pacific Island countries
like Solomon Islands were kept under
its diplomatic wings.
The Solomon Islands government
gave President Shui-bian the highest
diplomatic treatment, rolling out the
red carpet in the humid afternoon sun
on 29 January, and then according
him the honor of addressing the
Solomon Islands National Parliament
on 31 January. Governor-General Sir
Nathaniel Waena hailed Taiwan as
“the only helper in Solomon Islands’
dark days” (Solomon Star, 1 Feb
2005). In response, President Shui-
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bian called Solomon Islands “Taiwan’s
most loyal ally in the Pacific” (Solo-
mon Star, 1 Feb 2005).
Taiwan’s relations with Solomon
Islands has captured much interest
over the years, especially in relation
to what is often described as Taiwan’s
“checkbook diplomacy.” More seri-
ous were allegations that Taiwanese
money had been used to buy and
maintain patron-client relationships
in domestic politics. Although no one
has offered substantial evidence to
prove this, it is clear that prior to the
ramsi intervention Taiwanese money
was used to pay “compensation” to
armed groups and individuals, fueling
the extortion of the state and the
maintenance of relationships between
some government officials and armed
citizens.
The debate surrounding Taiwanese
money came to the fore in the lead-up
to the 2006 election, with two mem-
bers of Parliament, Joses Tuhanuku
and Alfred Sasako, accusing Taiwan
of bankrolling particular politicians,
including Prime Minister Allan Kema-
keza and his Peoples Alliance Party
(Solomon Star, 17, 20, 21, 22 March
2006).
The Taiwanese president’s visit was
significant, but as soon as he left the
country, domestic politics shifted back
to its usual gear. During the February
meeting of the National Parliament,
for example, Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu
moved a motion of no confidence in
Prime Minister Kemakeza, accusing
his government of unfairly dismissing
public servants and mistreating work-
ers at the Russell Islands Plantation
Estate Limited. However, realizing
that he didn’t have the numbers to
carry it through, Ulufa‘alu withdrew
the motion before it could be voted
on. In reaction, Kemakeza described
Ulufa‘alu as “a total coward” (Solo-
mon Star, 14 Feb 2005).
During the same meeting, the
National Parliament also debated 
and passed three reports on the
review of ramsi’s first year of opera-
tion: (1) the Review Report by the
Intervention Taskforce Committee; 
(2) the Cabinet Committee’s Report
of the Taskforce’s Review; and (3) the
Parliamentary Foreign Relations
Committee Review Report. The
debate was at times heated as parlia-
mentarians expressed differing opin-
ions about the work of the Regional
Assistance Mission. While many
expressed appreciation of ramsi’s
contributions to the restoration and
maintenance of law and order and the
continuing efforts to rebuild the coun-
try, some expressed concern about the
approaches it employed. Then Minis-
ter for Police and Justice Michael
Maina, for example, claimed that the
“gap between ramsi and [the Royal
Solomon Islands Police] rsip is deep-
ening.” He called for the closing of
the gap, and requested that Solomon
Islands’ “friends must listen” (Solo-
mon Star, 2 Feb 2005). Then Minister
of Finance Francis Zama made sting-
ing criticisms of the Regional Assis-
tance Mission, expressing concern
about ramsi officials taking on line
positions in the public service and
how that could be unsustainable in
the longer term.
For his criticism of ramsi, Zama
found himself at the wrong end of the
prime minister’s political whip. He
was sacked as cabinet minister, and
Kemakeza made no secret of the fact
that it was because of Zama’s critical
comments about ramsi. Zama said
that he would not rule out the possi-
426 the contemporary pacific • 18:2 (2006)
bility that Australian authorities might
have had a hand in his dismissal
(Solomon Star, 4 Feb 2005).
The country’s political discussions
were not confined to the National
Parliament. Politics outside of Parlia-
ment were as dynamic as they have
always been, and, as expected, were
influenced a great deal by issues
emerging out of the social unrest.
One interesting development was the
emergence of the Ma‘asina Forum,
a social movement that claimed to
champion the interests of Malaita
people. Formed initially to facilitate
discussions about development on
Malaita, the Ma‘asina Forum later
shifted to other issues such as a
demand for Malaita’s independence.
People increasingly perceived the
movement as anti–central govern-
ment and as pushed by a few elites in
Honiara to serve their own political
agendas. Commenting on the issue
of independence, Malaita’s Anglican
Bishop, the Rev Terry Brown, said
that “there is little grassroots interest
in independence in Malaita, indeed,
even some resentment of Honiara
elites trying to run the show again”
(Solomon Star, 31 January 2005).
In the other provinces, there were
attempts to bring people together to
reflect on what had happened and
map out paths into the future. The
Guadalcanal and Western provinces,
for example, organized leaders sum-
mits to discuss issues important to
their respective provinces. The
Guadalcanal Province Leaders
Summit in February brought together
more than 100 participants, and after-
wards the provincial government pro-
duced a document called “The Way
Forward,” aimed at setting direction
for the future. In late February the
Western Province held its own leaders
summit in Gizo, bringing together
people from various sectors of society.
Another issue that dominated pub-
lic discussions throughout 2005—as it
did in prior years—was the proposal
to introduce federalism, or a state
government system, as it is commonly
known in Solomon Islands. This issue,
which had been around since indepen-
dence, became prominent during the
social unrest because of Guadalcanal
Province’s demand for the establish-
ment of a federal system of govern-
ment to replace the existing unitary
system. In 2003 and 2004 the United
Nations Development Program spon-
sored a nationwide consultation
aimed at facilitating constitutional
reform to accommodate federalism.
Since then, a draft federal constitution
has been produced. Despite this, the
debate has continued, with people
expressing both support and opposi-
tion to the proposal. The Western and
Guadalcanal provinces strongly sup-
port federalism. In December 2005,
for instance, Western Province Pre-
mier Alex Lokopio stated his prov-
ince’s disappointment with the central
government’s delay in tabling the
draft federal constitution. He said
that the Western Provincial Govern-
ment “believes that State Government
is a prerequisite for peace and pros-
perity and seeks it as a matter for
survival” (sibc News, 7 Dec 2005).
On the other hand, individuals and
organizations such as the Ma‘asina
Forum were opposed to the proposed
federal system.
Apart from the political dramas,
2005 was also dominated by the con-
tinuing efforts to restore and maintain
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law and order and strengthen state
capacity. There was widespread recog-
nition of the fragility of the law and
order situation. This was fatally
demonstrated by the shooting of
Adam Dunning, a twenty-six-year-old
Australian police officer, on the out-
skirts of Honiara in December 2004.
As part of the attempt to restore
law and order and ensure the preva-
lence of justice, there were calls for
the instigators of the social unrest to
be brought before the courts. While
people appreciated the good work
that the Regional Assistance Mission
had done, there was a perception that
they had not brought the “big fish” to
justice and had not addressed the root
causes of the social unrest. Former
Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare,
for example, said that “this country
will be the same again unless these
people are brought to justice” (Solo-
mon Star, 21 Dec 2004). Bishop Terry
Brown also raised similar concerns,
saying that during the civil unrest
“many political and business figures
were involved in some potentially
criminal behavior” (sibc News, 9 Feb
2005). There were also allegations
that Prime Minister Kemakeza was
involved in criminal activities and
should therefore be charged. Kema-
keza, however, insisted that he was
innocent and the police stated that
they had nothing to charge him with.
Despite the police statement, through-
out 2005 certain individuals contin-
ued to demand that Kemakeza be
investigated and charged.
While the prime minister was never
charged, some of his cabinet ministers
were not as fortunate. By the end of
2005, five cabinet ministers had been
arrested and charged for crimes such
as demanding money with menaces,
false pretenses, inciting others to
commit arson, arson, and corruption.
They included Minister for Agricul-
ture Alex Bartlett, Minister of Provin-
cial Government Clement Rojumana,
Minister for Police and Justice
Michael Maina, Minister for Health
Benjamin Una, and Minister of
Finance Francis Zama. All except
Bartlett were released on bail.
The arrests of these cabinet minis-
ters signaled a new era in Solomon
Islands political history—it was the
first time that cabinet ministers have
ever been arrested and charged for
corruption while in office. Many ordi-
nary citizens hailed it as a step in the
right direction and there was hope
that other “big fish” would eventually
be caught. In fact, as late as March
2006, during a public forum at the
Auki Market and Malu‘u on Malaita
to mark the visit of a ramsi delega-
tion led by Special Coordinator James
Batley, people expressed the desire to
see the “big fish” arrested (Solomon
Star, 27 March 2006). 
Cabinet ministers were not the
only “big fish” caught by the law in
2005. Prominent lawyer and Malaita
Eagle Force (mef) leader Andrew
Nori was arrested in April 2005 and
charged (along with other prominent
mef leaders) with the misuse of si$5
million (us$980,000) paid to the
Malaita Province as compensation
during the height of the social unrest.
Another prominent figure who found
himself on the wrong side of the law
was Ezekiel Alebua, a former prime
minister and premier for Guadalcanal
Province. He was arrested in August
2005 and charged with four counts of
larceny relating to money paid to the
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Guadalcanal Province, also during the
period of social unrest.
In the meantime, the courts were
processing cases relating to other
“high-profile” individuals like Harold
Keke, Jimmy “Rasta” Lusibaea,
Andrew Te‘e, Moses Su‘u, and others
who had been arrested in the previous
two years. The highlight of early 2005
court cases was the trial of Harold
Keke, Ronnie Cawa, and Francis Lela
for the murder of the former cabinet
minister and member of Parliament
for South Guadalcanal, Fr Augustine
Qeve. In March the three were sen-
tenced to life in prison. Another case
that attracted a lot of public interest
concerned the murder of six Melane-
sian Brothers of the Church of Mela-
nesia. In October 2005, Ronnie Cawa,
Owen Isa, and Joses Kejoa were
found guilty in this case. The trial for
the murder of Selwyn Saki, a former
leader of the Isatabu Freedom Move-
ment, continued into 2006. 
Apart from law and order issues,
2005 also witnessed public-sector
reforms aimed at strengthening the
public service and making it more
efficient and effective. There was par-
ticular emphasis on the Inland Rev-
enue Department, and accountability
institutions such as the Auditor Gen-
eral’s Office, the Leadership Code
Commission, and the Ombudsman’s
Office. By the end of 2005, efforts to
strengthen these institutions seemed
to be paying off. Inland Revenue was
collecting more returns than it had in
the previous two years, and there was
a push to improve the tax system and
enforce existing tax regulations. In
late 2005 the Auditor General put out
two reports that revealed extensive
mismanagement and misappropria-
tion of funds in the fisheries and
forestry departments. Through these
reports, ordinary Solomon Islanders
for the first time caught a glimpse of
what they had always suspected was
happening in government depart-
ments. There was public outcry for
those responsible to be either disci-
plined or charged.
On the economic front, in Novem-
ber 2005 Central Bank Governor Rick
Hou reminded everyone that eco-
nomic recovery would continue to be
a difficult challenge. He said that the
growth of the past year was not
enough to make up for the economic
decline of the previous five years.
Further, the country faced challenges
such as rapid population growth,
narrow export base, and the risk of
high inflation. Hou also pointed out
that rising oil prices posed risks to
inflation, and excess liquidity posed
potential risk to external reserves,
inflation, and government debt,
which could threaten sustainability
(sibc News, 2 Nov 2005).
To address some of the economic
challenges, the government pushed
to reopen two of the major income-
generating industries on Guadalcanal:
the oil palm plantation on the Guadal-
canal Plains and the Gold Ridge gold
mine in Central Guadalcanal. The
Papua New Guinea–based New Brit-
ain Oil Palm Limited subsequently
signed an agreement to invest in the
palm oil plantation. A company
called the Guadalcanal Plains Palm
Oil Limited (gppol) was established,
and by the end of 2005 work had
begun clearing the plantation and
rebuilding infrastructure destroyed
during the social unrest. However,
the operation suffered a major set-
political reviews • melanesia 429
back when on 8 February 2006 the
newly built gppol office at Tetere
was burned. Despite this, the com-
pany was determined to continue
with the project.
The reopening of the Gold Ridge
mine was, however, much slower and
complicated by landowner demands
for renegotiation of the mining
agreement, which had been signed
with the previous owner of the mine,
Ross Mining. The new owner was
an Australian consortium known
as Australia Solomons Gold. By the
end of 2005 negotiations were still
continuing.
The proposal for the establishment
of the Auluta Palm Oil plantation on
East Malaita was extensively dis-
cussed in 2005. Negotiation with
landowning groups had been going
on for sometime, and there was wide-
spread support from the Malaita
Provincial Government and land-
owning groups in the area. However,
by the beginning of 2006 on-the-
ground work on the plantation had
not yet started. There were calls for
the government that will take office
after the April 2006 election to make
this project a priority.
In the meantime, traditional
industries such as forestry and
fisheries continued to be important.
Also significant was the role of small-
scale farmers in villages around the
country. Indeed, the governor of the
Central Bank commented in 2004
that the growth of the economy in
2003 was attributable to the contri-
butions of small-scale farmers.
The year had its share of public
controversies. The most prominent
involved the National Provident Fund
(npf), the country’s only superannua-
tion scheme, recording a loss of more
than si$52 million (us$10.2 million)
in 2004; and the ongoing strike at
the Russell Islands Plantation Estates
Limited (ripel) in the Central Islands
Province. Workers throughout the
country were angered to learn of the
npf’s losses and were concerned that
they could lose their life’s savings. In
the meantime, ripel workers were
on strike for most of 2005, inciting
heated debates between the govern-
ment, the union, and the owners of
the estate. The strike has continued
into 2006 and is likely to influence
election outcomes.
In spite of all the difficulties that
the country has faced in the last cou-
ple of years, my spirit is always lifted
by the general sense of optimism
among Solomon Islanders, however
cautious they might be. It is always
great to see people gather, chew betel
nut, reflect on what has happened,
and map ways forward. At all levels
of society, people are working to heal
the wounds of the social unrest. This
optimism and work in mending rela-
tionships and rebuilding communities
must be identified and nurtured by
those wanting to help Solomon
Islands. While the bigger picture of
the nation-state is important, it is
these communities that provide the
foundation for the larger entity.
The April 2006 election brings
cautious hope that the country will
enter a new era. During this era,
assistance from Solomon Islands’
neighbors, such as that demonstrated
by the Regional Assistance Mission,
will continue to be important. In
helping, however, outsiders must
ensure that they do not take over the
agenda. Rather, they should provide
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the space for Solomon Islanders to set
their own agenda and plot the course
to the future. This will ensure that the
good work that has been done so far
is sustained and will avoid continuing
dependence on neighbors. Those
wanting to help must be aware that
Solomon Islanders could easily say,
“Sapos yu laik duim, olsem yu duim,
mi lukluk” (If you want to do it, then
you do it and I’ll watch).
tarcisius tara kabutaulaka
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Vanuatu
Vanuatu celebrated its twenty-fifth
year of independence in 2005. How-
ever, it has largely been “business as
usual” on the political front, with the
normal morass of personal or person-
ality-based politicking, leavened by a
number of scandals. There was some
instability in the national government
and some political parties, and a
number of management issues arose
in various state institutions, but 2005
was not as turbulent as some recent
years have been. It has, however, been
a year of complexity. Maneuverings
within and between parties have
affected both local (municipal) and
national politics, and local politics
has affected national politics as well.
Various state-owned enterprises have
also had their composition affected 
as the political fortunes of various
parties have changed. 
In national politics, the year began
with Ham Lini as prime minister of a
newly formed government. Ham Lini
is a relative newcomer to national
politics, only assuming a leadership
role in National United Party (nup)
following the death of his brother 
in 1999. He gained the position of 
prime minister in December 2004,
after a no-confidence vote in the
short-lived government that had 
been formed following the July 
2004 elections, led by Serge Vohor
(Union of Moderate Parties, or ump).
While there was some talk that this
was “Vanuatu’s Lini legacy revived”
(PVPO, 14 Dec 2004), Ham Lini is
operating in an environment more
political than the one that existed 
for his brother, Father Walter Hadye
Lini, in the years following inde-
pendence.
Father Lini, who was prime min-
ister from 1980 to 1991, operated
under what was basically a two-party
system. He led a Vanua‘aku Party
(vp) government. The primary oppo-
sition was the ump, which had its
roots in a collection of several small
francophone parties. Following the
1987 election, only three parties—
vp, ump, and the Fren Melanesian
Party (which had one seat)—were
represented in Parliament. However,
1987 marked the beginning of the
change to a political system in which
many small parties vie for power, 
and coalition government is now the
rule rather than the exception. After
Father Lini suffered a stroke in 1987,
others began to challenge his leader-
ship. In 1988 Barak Sope broke from
the vp to form the Melanesian Pro-
gressive Party (mpp), and in 1991
Donald Kalpokas replaced Lini as 
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the prime minister and vp leader. 
This prompted Father Lini to split
from vp and form the nup. Since
then, the number of parties has pro-
liferated and the number represented
in Parliament has gradually grown,
from six parties following the 1991
election to ten parties (plus nine
independent candidates) following 
the 2004 election.
Ham Lini’s coalition at the begin-
ning of 2005 represented eleven par-
ties. Essentially a line was drawn
between ump in opposition, and
everyone else in a coalition govern-
ment. Lini gained the position of
prime minister on 11 December 2004,
but his position was far from stable,
and by 31 December there were
already media reports of planned
reshuffles to try to accommodate all
the coalition partners. Throughout
the year there were a number of
changes in the cabinet and alterations
to the coalition. The most significant
of these occurred in November,
when then Finance Minister Moana
Carcasses Kalosil was removed from
cabinet and the Greens Confederation
(gc) removed from the coalition
(VDP, 15 Nov 2005). This split was
brought about in part because gc
was gaining increasing power and
demanding additional seats in cabinet
(Independent, 28 Aug 2005; VDP,
26 Sept 2005). A second factor in this
split was related to political maneu-
vering for the position of lord mayor
of Port Vila. gc had signed an agree-
ment with vp and the opposition ump
that was to give the position of mayor
to ump and the position of deputy
mayor to gc, to be rotated after two
years. This effectively placed gc in
alliance with the opposition and shut
out one of the main coalition part-
ners, nup. The gc/ump/vp agree-
ment was later trumped by a second
agreement between nup, vp, the Van-
uatu Republican Party (vrp) and the
National Community Association
(nca), which gave the position of
mayor to vp (VDP, 11 Nov 2005).
The ousting of gc from the govern-
ment created a potentially powerful
gc/ump opposition. Despite the
various reshuffles, the Ham Lini–led
government managed to survive two
proposed no-confidence motions in
2004. It continues to govern into
2006, although rumors of further 
no-confidence votes and reshuffles
continue.
The shifting sands that have char-
acterized the nature of the coalition
have also been reflected within the
larger political parties, particularly
nup and vp, where a superficial
glance may suggest that a cohesive
party exists, but closer examination
reveals rifts and many shifts of
allegiance. 
From the beginning of 2005 it
was apparent that a power struggle
between Ham Lini and Willy Jimmy
was occurring, when Jimmy was not
present at Lini’s swearing in as prime
minister (Independent, 9 Jan 2005).
In January Jimmy claimed that a
reshuffle putting nup, ump, and the
Greens Confederacy (gc) into govern-
ment had been promised, and that if
it did not take place he and a block
of five or six other nup members of
Parliament would move to Vanuatu
National Party (vnp), which had been
formed by Dinh Van Than after dis-
agreements with Lini (Independent,
11 Jan 2005). While Jimmy did not
split from nup, tensions again sur-
432 the contemporary pacific • 18:2 (2006)
faced at the nup national congress
at Motalava in October. Two lists of
people were eligible to vote for execu-
tive. Because of this, nup Chairman
Meto Chilia said he “decided to sus-
pend the congress for a few hours to
allow the former executive to meet
and have a compromise decision
before proceeding to the election of
the new executive” (PVPO, 25 Oct
2005). However, Lini used his power
as president to let the elections go
ahead. Willie Jimmy and his support-
ers walked out and Lini was reelected
president (PVPO, 18 Oct 2005). There
was some talk that the decision at the
Motalava congress would be chal-
lenged in court, and that Lini would
use this incident as an excuse to drop
Jimmy from the cabinet. Despite 
these rumors, Lini did not shuffle
Jimmy out of cabinet, which would
have created a deep rift within nup,
and instead he publicly confirmed
Jimmy’s place as a minister, stating 
to the media, “I still need him in my
government” (PVPO, 25 Oct 2005).
Jimmy subsequently benefited from
gc’s removal from the governing
coalition, assuming the position of
minister of finance after Carcasses
was shuffled out in November (VDP,
12 Nov 2005).
Similar irregularities in voting and
power plays between senior members
of vp were largely responsible for
causing the rift that is still continuing.
These problems became apparent at
the vp congress held at Lingarak in
October 2003. Voting on the vp exec-
utive split the party between the “old
guard,” which includes Kalpokas,
Sela Molisa, Joe Natuman, and Jack-
leen Reuben Titek, and the supporters
of Edward Natapei, who was then
prime minister. At the Lingarak con-
gress a motion to oust the old execu-
tive was passed, but vp Honorary
President Kalpokas then declared
the vote invalid due to irregularities.
The friction within vp led Natapei to
dissolve Parliament in 2004 in order
to avoid a vote of no confidence that
would have been supported by a
number of vp members of Parliament.
Numerous legal challenges arose con-
cerning the vp leadership and who
would be permitted to use the vp
name during the national election.
While the court ruled that both
parties would be permitted to use
the vp name, ultimately most of the
Kalpokas faction stood under the
Vanua K Group banner. 
It was hoped that the 2005 Con-
gress would see a reunification of vp.
However, factions were still running
to court immediately prior to the elec-
tion in order to “set up ways to con-
trol registration of sub-committees
having the right to attend the party’s
congress as required by the internal
regulations of the party” (PVPO, 23
Aug 2005). Despite fears that pre-
Congress court maneuverings might
be an ill omen for chances of recon-
ciliation, the Congress did achieve at
least some degree of finality in who
leads vp, when Natapei was elected
president (VDP, 1 Sept 2005). How-
ever, the executive does not contain
any representatives from the “old
guard” (VDP, 2 Sept 2005), so long-
term harmony within vp is still in
some doubt. 
There was also more than a hint
of vote buying by the Natapei camp.
Harry Iauko, “the architect of the 
re-election of Natapei” (VDP, 25 Sept
2005), was appointed vp secretary-
political reviews • melanesia 433
general. It appears he had made a
number of promises to various people
in return for votes. One was that
Daniel Bule be appointed Chair and
others be appointed to the board of
the Vanuatu Maritime Authority
(vma). These appointments were
referred to the Supreme Court by the
vma. The court halted the appoint-
ments, as correct procedure had not
been followed and the new appointees
did not have the statutorily required
experience within the shipping indus-
try (VDP, 21 Sept 2005).
Hostilities between Iauko and Min-
ister for Internal Affairs George Wells
also broke out after Wells terminated
twenty-one employees of the Port Vila
Municipal Council (pvmc) as part of
a redundancy exercise (VDP, 19 Sept
2005). The redundancies came after a
number of inquiries into mismanage-
ment within the council. Reports of
mismanagement resulted in the
suspension of the council and the
appointment of former Ombudsman
Hannington Alatoa as commissioner.
Alatoa had the unenviable job of
trying to bring order to the council.
Some of those terminated under the
redundancy package were “key Nata-
pei supporters” (VDP, 26 Sept 2005),
and Iauko demanded their reinstate-
ment. Wells refused and threatened to
leave vp and join nup if the termi-
nated workers were reinstated (VDP,
25 Sept 2005). Ultimately Iauko did
not get his way, and Wells remained
with vp, although it remains to be
seen whether Iauko can retain his
influence within vp, having failed to
deliver on various promises.
As we have seen, from both the
ousting of gc from the coalition gov-
ernment and friction between Wells
and Iauko, politicking on the munici-
pal level has affected national politics.
The operation of the pvmc has in
itself also been a major political story
in 2005. The position of lord mayor
is determined by voting by the pvmc.
In December 2004, Joseph Aron of
vp replaced Patrick Crowby Mana-
rewo of nup, who had held the may-
oral position for a number of years.
While this vote was initially chal-
lenged on the grounds of procedural
irregularities (PVPO, 20 Dec 2004),
Aron’s election was later confirmed as
having taken place properly (PVPO, 23
Dec 2004). Crowby was subsequently
appointed government spokesman, in
consolation for losing his position as
mayor (PVPO, 6 Jan 2006). Although
the vp-led overthrow of Crowby did
create some tension between vp and
nup (Independent, 27 Feb 2005), this
did not have any serious effect on the
coalition government. 
Aron soon suspended Town Clerk
Madeleine Tom and Deputy Town
Clerk Fatané Sope, replacing them
with vp supporters (PVPO, 5 Jan
2005), although the appointment of
the new town clerk was subsequently
canceled because correct procedure
had not been followed (PVPO, 18 July
2005). By the end of January the 
14-member council was reduced to
9 members, with 4 members being
suspended for failing to attend three
consecutive meetings (PVPO, 25 Jan
2005; 11 Feb 2005), and Crowby
resigning (PVPO, 25 Jan 2005). 
It soon became apparent that the
suspension of Tom and Fatané Sope
was not solely politically motivated
and that there had been significant
mismanagement within the pvmc.
Sope’s status was resolved early when
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he was terminated for misconduct,
having continued to access and
remove pvmc papers despite his
suspension (PVPO, 25 Jan 2005). In a
report into allegations of embezzle-
ment within the pvmc, it became
apparent that there were at least
sufficient grounds for a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing by Tom
(PVPO, 29 March 2005). Crowby
was also implicated in this report.
The report also alleged that Tom had
been recruited illegally, had improp-
erly employed her son in the pvmc,
and had used the pvmc to purchase
building materials for her private
use (PVPO, 4 April 2005). While Tom
refuted these claims, Aron requested
that the minister for internal affairs
terminate her (PVPO, 25 April 2005).
Tom was not terminated, but as
various allegations of wrongdoing
within the pvmc came to light, Wells
took the step of suspending the pvmc
and appointing former Ombudsman
Hannington Alatoa as commissioner.
While Alatoa was commissioner,
further reports detailing misappropri-
ation of funds and mismanagement
came to light. Not only was there
misappropriation under Crowby’s
regime, and unpaid property taxes
of more than 280 million vatu (PVPO,
20 Sept 2005), but under Aron’s lead-
ership more than 6 million vatu in
illegal allowances had been paid to
councilors in the first eight months of
2005 (Independent, 15 Oct 2005). 
The elections for the new pvmc
saw a record 177 candidates stand.
However, voter turnout was only 51
percent. Crowby was reelected and
Aron lost his position. Seats were
fairly evenly divided among the main
political parties, with ump, nup, vp,
and gc gaining three seats apiece.
The remaining two seats were taken
by vrp and the nca (PVPO, 3 Nov
2005). As discussed earlier, because
there was no clear leader among the
political parties, a period of negotia-
tion and coalition building ensued.
During this process ump and gc
aligned, eventually resulting in gc
being ousted from the governing
coalition. Ultimately a coalition of
nup, vp, vrp, and nca was formed,
and vp’s Paul Avock elected mayor
(VDP, 12 Nov 2005). However, a
number of elected councilors may
not remain in place for very long.
Wells stated that councilors with
money owing to the pvmc had until
30 November to settle their debts or
their seats would be vacated. Whether
or not this occurs appears to depend
on whether there is sufficient money
to hold a by-election (VDP, 8 Nov
2005).
The Port Vila Municipal Council
was not alone in undergoing difficul-
ties, however. The Luganville Muni-
cipal Council (lmc) town clerk was
terminated for misconduct in January
after loaning money to someone out-
side of the lmc in contravention of
direct orders from the director of
internal affairs (PVPO, 27 Jan 2005).
The lmc itself was suspended in
March (PVPO, 22 March 2005), and
Paul Hakwa was appointed as com-
missioner for a period of twelve
months. The lmc was reported to
be in debt by almost 30 million vatu,
including 4.5 million in cash advances
that had not been repaid. It was esti-
mated that 9 million vatu was owed
to creditors, and that outstanding
debtors owed the lmc approximately
10 million vatu (Independent, 24
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April 2005). The minister for internal
affairs stated that it was his intention
to first get the affairs of the lmc in
order, then tackle those of the pvmc,
before turning to the Sanma Provin-
cial Council, which is facing similar
allegations of gross financial misman-
agement (Independent, 20 March
2005).
A number of state-owned enter-
prises and state institutions found
themselves in the news again in 2005.
Foremost among these were the
police, the Vanuatu Maritime
Authority, and Air Vanuatu. 
The year 2005 again saw the Vanu-
atu Police Force struggling with issues
of leadership. In 2004 Robert Diniro
had been suspended as commissioner
of police, and Joshua Bong had been
suspended as commander of the
Vanuatu Mobile Force following an
attempted arrest of then Prime Minis-
ter Serge Vohor (VDP, 14 Sept 2004).
As a side note, the Commission of
Enquiry that was appointed to look
into potential improper motives
behind this attempted arrest finally
made its report to the government at
the end of May 2005 (Independent,
29 May 2005). The inquiry cost more
than 1.2 million vatu (us$10,500),
excluding court costs (Independent, 23
Jan 2005), and the report has never
been made public. In December the
Public Prosecutor’s Office was
ordered to pay Serge Vohor over 2
million vatu in court costs arising
from the criminal charges that had
been filed against him, precipitating
the attempted arrest (VDP, 3 Dec
2005). 
Arthur Caulton was appointed
acting commissioner of the police in
2004 following these suspensions.
While Bong was reinstated in April
2005 (Independent, 17 April 2005),
Diniro was not, and was formally
removed as commissioner by the
president on 16 June (Independent,
1 July 05). There was dissatisfaction
among the police with Caulton’s lead-
ership, along with stories of intended
mass resignations, brought about by
a combination of low pay, no incen-
tives, and lack of confidence in the
leadership of the force (Independent,
1 May 2005). There were also calls
from within the force for Caulton to
resign and be replaced by Aru Mara-
lau (PVPO, 24 May 2005). Despite
this, Caulton continued in his acting
position, although he suffered a
hiccup in November when the Police
Services Commission removed him
from his post and appointed Vanuatu
Military Forces Major Kalshem
Bongram in his place (VDP, 26 Nov
2005). Caulton filed for judicial
review in court, on the grounds that
only the president could terminate
him (VDP, 1 Dec 2005), and the presi-
dent later confirmed that Caulton
would remain as acting police com-
missioner until terminated by the
head of state (VDP, 6 Dec 2005).
While the position of acting com-
missioner has not been without con-
troversy, the government has been
slow to appoint a new commissioner,
in part due to difficulties within the
Police Services Commission, and in
part due to debate about whether the
new commissioner should be a for-
eigner. The government appeared to
be committed to appointing a foreign
police commissioner, in order to bring
stability to the police (Independent,
12 June 2005), although the idea of a
foreigner in a top public service posi-
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tion was not without controversy, and
was opposed by a number of people.
No progress in appointing anyone
permanently to the position had been
made by the end of the year. By early
2006 applications for a local police
commissioner had been sought, on the
grounds that the Constitution states
that only citizens of Vanuatu should
be appointed to Vanuatu. Because of
this, “This senior police force position
should only be given to an expatriate
if no one among the applicants is a
suitable candidate” (PVPO, 1 Feb
2006).
The Vanuatu Maritime Authority
was not only in the news due to polit-
ical interference in appointments to
the board, as discussed earlier. As has
become normal for this institution, it
was also embroiled in a number of
other controversies. In 2005 the vma
was the subject of an ombudsman’s
report, which recommended that
vma Chair Christopher Emelee be
prosecuted for recruiting a foreigner
without acquiring the correct work
permits (PVPO, 18 Oct 2005). This,
however, was the least of the vma’s
worries. As detailed in previous Vanu-
atu political reviews, there have been
issues with staffing and membership
of the vma board for a number of
years. Over the last two years, costs
from illegal terminations have cost
the vma around 20 million vatu,
with Marie Noelle Ferrieux Patterson
being awarded just over 10 million
vatu in 2004 and Bani Timbaci being
awarded almost 10 million vatu in
September 2005, although the pay-
ment to Timbaci was later reduced to
about 5 million vatu on appeal. This
created the interesting response that
people who cost the government
money through their own mismanage-
ment should bear the costs of their
errors. Willie Jimmy was particularly
well reported on this issue, stating in
the media “that the vma is a classic
example of the people holding high
positions at statutory bodies who
draft their contracts themselves to
suit themselves. Those people should
have to face the consequences and
pay compensation claims instead of
giving the burden to those institutions
they penalise” (PVPO, 25 Oct 2005). 
This position was turned around in
October, when the Ministry of Public
Utilities reached an out-of-court set-
tlement of 35 million vatu with the
owner of the Southern Star. The
matter arose after the Southern Star
had an insurance claim with qbe
Insurance declined, in part because
of wrongful information provided by
Timbaci (who at the time was acting
vma commissioner) that the captain
and chief engineer were not properly
qualified. Current vma Commissioner
Less John Napuati was not slow to
point out that it was unfortunate that
an individual’s professional negligence
was costing the country money (VDP,
19 Nov 2005).
In May, Napuati, along with
Emelee, former vma advisor Guy
Bernard, former vma board member
John Simbolo, and former Minister
for Fisheries Stephen Kalsakau, must
have breathed a sigh of relief when
the case against them for conspiring
to defeat the course of justice was
struck down by the Supreme Court
because of prosecution delays. This
case, which has been detailed in previ-
ous Vanuatu political reviews, arose
after the crews of two fishing vessels
were arrested for fishing in Vanuatu
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waters without a license, but subse-
quently apparently backdated licenses
were produced. However, in June the
Court of Appeal overturned the
Supreme Court decision, and by the
close of 2005 the trial was still pro-
ceeding (Public Prosecutor v Emelee).
The embattled vma has struck back
by suing the police and the Fisheries
Department for 12 million vatu in
wharfage fees that arose when a Chi-
nese vessel was seized by officials and
kept in custody for over 300 days
pending trial (VDP, 27 Oct 2005).
Air Vanuatu is another institution
that is no stranger to controversy.
The latest round began when the Air
Vanuatu and Vanair boards again
remerged at the beginning of 2005
(pir, 10 Jan 2005). A large board,
which eventually numbered close to
thirty, was appointed to manage the
airline. In January 2005, Chief Execu-
tive Jean-Paul Virelala and Marketing
Manager Joseph Laloyer were both
terminated, apparently to make way
for political appointees. As a result of
these terminations, Air Vanuatu was
sued by Virelala for 74 million vatu
and by Laloyer for 50 million vatu
(PVPO, 22 Feb 2005). In an odd twist,
Laloyer was subsequently reinstated
in order to avoid unbudgeted termina-
tion costs. This apparently resulted in
the termination of Henry Iauko as
chair of the Board of Management
for Air Vanuatu, by Utilities Minister
Maxime Carlot. It was reported in the
media that “the decision of Minister
Carlot was purely personal. ‘Minister
Carlot had promised to put out
Laloyer if ever he got back into
power because he had refused to
include Carlot on a particular Port
Vila–Nouméa flight,’ said [a] govern-
ment source” (PVPO, 18 July 2005).
Iauko was soon reinstated.
More disruptive has been the pro-
gressive strike actions by Air Vanuatu
staff who are members of the Vanuatu
National Workers Union (vnwu).
The initial grievances that sparked a
long and drawn-out industrial action
are unclear. A brief timeline is as
follows: On August 12 the minister
for internal affairs made an order that
no industrial actions take place for a
period of two months, while concilia-
tion took place (VDP, 9 Dec 2005).
Despite this, some Air Vanuatu staff
did go out on strike. In early Septem-
ber, 26 Air Vanuatu staff were termi-
nated. All these were union members;
however the termination is legal
because proper termination allow-
ances were paid out (VDP, 6 Sept
2005). Air Vanuatu ceo Terry Kerr
later said that the terminations were
part of ongoing restructuring, and
that this would save Air Vanuatu 30
million vatu per year (VDP, 24 Sept
2005). In October another 4 staff
from the finance department were
terminated, again as part of restruc-
turing (VDP, 22 Oct 2005). By the end
of November, staff of Air Vanuatu
and Vanuatu Abattoirs Ltd, which
has also been rocked by strike actions
throughout the year, gathered to
picket (VDP, 29 Nov 2005). The
picket action was discontinued
following (untrue) rumors that police
had been given permission to carry
arms (VDP, 30 Nov 2005). In early
December, another 16 staff members
were terminated (Independent, 3 Dec
2005). Picketing again resumed,
resulting in 48 people being arrested
and charged with unlawful assembly
(VDP, 10 Dec 2005).
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This issue continues unresolved
into 2006. It is of grave concern to
the tourism industry, as flights have
been adversely affected. vnwu’s
growing power (and, some might
say, its irresponsible exercise of that
power) is also of concern to all busi-
nesses in Vanuatu. At least one long-
standing business that provided staff
with benefits in excess of the statutory
minimums has closed down in 2005
due to pressure placed on it by the
vnwu. 
There are a number of potentially
volatile issues that continue to fester
into 2006, but there was a final bright
spot for the country near the end of
the year, when Vanuatu finalized
negotiations with the United States
for funds from the Millennium Chal-
lenge Corporation (mcc). The agree-
ment is for the United States to pro-
vide us$66 million, primarily to be
used for the construction of roads.
The agreement is to be signed in early
2006 (VDP, 19 Nov 2005). Vanuatu
has also been ruled eligible to apply
for further funding in the 2006 mcc
funding round.
anita jowitt
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